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NATIONAL STRATEGIC REVIEW 2025

Courtesy translation. The French document is the official version.

We are at a tipping point.

The trends observed over the past several years have accelerated dramatically. The wars in Ukraine, Gaza, and Sudan, as well as the crisis in Iran, are undoubtedly the most acute symptoms of global instability.

However, there are some constant elements in this disruption.

The first is the ongoing Russian threat at Europe's borders, a lasting threat that is being organised and prepared, and which we must be able to face in the future. For Europeans, ultimately, this is at the root of everything.

The second is the uninhibited use of force, which can be observed in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and elsewhere, with ever-increasing violence unfolding. Violence, moreover, that is not always the preserve of States – and terrorism has not disappeared.

The third, in these brutal times, is the need for Europeans to rely increasingly on their own forces, as the world seems to be dividing into large zones where the solidarity of alliances is no longer guaranteed. This is not the least of the attitude shifts that we must make, together with our partners, but France, with its tradition of independence, is better prepared for this than others.

The fourth, finally, is the technological revolution that is taking place in parallel, with today's artificial intelligence, electronic warfare, space and quantum technology. It is also the revolution accelerated by the battlefields, this upheaval that combines engineering and ingenuity, driven by the need to survive and adapt. The fight being waged by the Ukrainians reminds us of the constants of war: the thousands of lives lost every day at the front, the essential unity of a nation to hold out, the strategic role of industry and international solidarity. But this war is also a war of disruption, where drones have become an extension of each combatant, where space communications connect every soldier, where cyber manoeuvres and electronic warfare determine the success of operations. It is a war that every citizen observes on social media without realising the propaganda operations that are developing there. Our thinking will have to change profoundly to incorporate these realities.

In light of all this, there will be no shortcuts or special privileges. This update to the National Strategic Review describes the world as it is. And if we want to guarantee the safety of our fellow citizens, the prosperity of our economy, and France's standing, there will be difficult decisions to make.

Decisions to give us the means to cope. This is the commitment we have recently made, together with our allies, to devote more resources to our defence and security so that we can collectively assume our responsibilities.

But we also need to bring about a European revolution. Europeans must provide themselves with the means to control their own destiny, develop their sovereignty and achieve the depth, mass and scale they need. To do this, we need to organise ourselves together, overcome fragmentation, bring talent together and trust each other.

Ultimately, a strategic revolution will be necessary. Europeans have become accustomed to letting others design their security, negotiate treaties that they sometimes violate, and basically decide on the most important issues on their behalf. That era is over. The time has come for Europeans to take control of their own destiny. I understand how daunting this may seem. But there has never been a more appropriate moment for it. And France has the talent and energy to achieve it. That is why I have faith in our country and in our Europe to rise to the challenge.

Emmanuel MACRON

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INTRODUCTION

1. The international situation has undergone profound changes since the publication of the 2022 National Strategic Review.

2. The rapid pace of the deterioration of the global security environment has been further confirmed by the simultaneity, multiplication, interpenetration, convergence and intensification of conflicts (Ukraine, the Middle East, Asia, Africa, etc.), an unprecedented increase in transnational threats (terrorism, organised crime, separatism, etc.) and the combination of challenges (climate, migration, energy, trade, etc.).

3. Russia in particular poses the most direct threat today and for years to come to the interests of France, those of its partners and allies, and the very stability of the European continent and the Euro-Atlantic area. In Ukraine, Moscow is waging an unrestrained war of aggression that has left nearly a million people dead and wounded, bombing the population and civilian infrastructure, sending North Korean troops to the front lines to fight directly on the European continent, relying on the Islamic Republic of Iran for part of its military equipment, while employing an irresponsible and uninhibited strategy of nuclear intimidation. The strengthening of its armed forces is continuing at an accelerated pace to replace the large amount of equipment destroyed in Ukraine, but also to develop new capabilities and strengthen its arsenal by 2030.

4. Furthermore, Russia is using all means at its disposal to undermine support for Ukraine and challenge the international order for its own benefit. To this end, Moscow is carrying out hostile and subversive actions in Europe. Russia organises or serves as a sanctuary for cyber attacks, for example against our hospitals and some of our energy facilities, targets and assassinates opponents in exile, manipulates or attempts to manipulate certain elections, and attempts to influence opinions in order to destabilise our societies.

5. Finally, and more broadly, it is the European model of liberal democracy and humanism that is now under attack and being challenged in a global ideological offensive. Within the European Union itself, this offensive is undermining our capacity for collective action.

6. Beyond that, Iran's destabilising actions have created the conditions for widespread war in the Middle East. China has also hardened its stance with a view to becoming the world's leading power by 2050, leading to major changes in the global geopolitical and technological environment.

7. In light of these actions, it is now clear that we are entering a new era, one in which there is a particularly high risk of a major high-intensity war in Europe, outside our national territory, involving France and its allies, particularly European ones, by 2030, and which would see our territory targeted at the same time by massive hybrid actions.

8. It is vital to prepare for this scenario: France and the Europeans must be capable of defending themselves more effectively and deterring any further Russian aggression on the continent. The European Union and its Member States have significantly stepped up their efforts in the field of defence and created a range of new instruments to support this endeavour. This build-up, aimed at ensuring Europe is ready to face renewed threats, will continue to be actively supported by France.

9. To achieve this, the modernisation of our armed forces and our defence industrial and technological base must be brought to completion, both at national and European level. In some respects, this transformation must amount to a true revolution: we need to scale up defence spending, rethink our model, and establish an agile defence industry. In particular, we must have efficient and modernised procurement structures to foster innovation and enable rapid adaptation whenever necessary.

10. The changes observed in the way recent wars have been waged must be taken into account. The future capabilities required to have the most effective army on the continent, ready to act in coalition with its allies and partners, must be designed and developed without delay. These transformations must enable us to have all the necessary equipment, in sufficient quantities, with

the shortest possible production cycles. The strategic capabilities of our armed forces will be strengthened and nuclear deterrence modernised.

11. To support this effort, it is essential that the entire nation mobilise to deal with the possible repercussions that such a conflict would have on the national territory. This will require strengthening France's resilience, involving its citizens in its defence and national security, through comprehensive mobilisation and a genuine moral rearmament of the population, particularly young people.

12. Furthermore, the US foreign policy priorities, which for several years have been focused on China, a real strategic challenge, and which have been made even more explicit by the new administration, are creating uncertainties that have already materialised in Washington's changing position on Ukraine and must therefore be integrated by Europeans in a lasting and structural manner.

13. Europe is at a major turning point in its history. Europeans must therefore take on greater responsibility for the continent's security and use all the means at their disposal to better defend themselves and deter any further aggression, regardless of how our partnerships with the United States and NATO, to which we remain deeply committed, may evolve. This requires strengthening the European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance and continuing efforts to increase defence and national security spending. Europe cannot take on greater responsibility for its own security and for peace on the continent without investing heavily in its defence and national security capabilities to enhance its resilience. This requires a clear ambition to prioritise European-made solutions, an approach that France will continue to promote across all instruments aimed at building Europe's strategic autonomy.

14. Likewise, for Europe to be more sovereign, it must have the means to produce the equipment it needs by significantly scaling up its industrial capabilities, developing key sectors, and, when necessary, choosing to support European champions in critical industries. This will strengthen Europe's strategic depth, industrial scale, and competitiveness, but it demands bold decisions and a willingness to accept shared, carefully managed dependencies with our partners, where the quality of French industries will be a decisive advantage.

15. Innovation and the development of strategic disruptive technologies can only be achieved if we invest sufficiently and better coordinate our actions to find the right balance between innovation and regulation. Europeans, in order to maintain their position in the world and promote their model, must once again unite and launch a genuine competitiveness drive.

16. This European cohesion and solidarity are all the more essential given that the risk of economic and technological war has increased significantly in recent months, threatening entire areas of our autonomy and sovereignty.

17. In response to these challenges, the update of the 2025 National Strategic Review analyses the changing strategic context and its consequences for France and its partners, and sets out the ambition to be achieved by 2030 to guarantee the defence and security of our nation and Europe, in conjunction with the efforts made by its partners and allies.

18. This ambition is broken down into eleven strategic objectives, which will be implemented simultaneously and set out in concrete terms in the third part of the document.

1

EVOLUTION OF THE STRATGIC CONTEXT SINCE 2022

Assessment of changes in the strategic environment

1. A rapid deterioration in global security

19. The growing intensity of power rivalries is reflected in the increasing number and severity of conflicts worldwide, with ever greater humanitarian, socio-economic, and security consequences. The systematic, brutal and unrestrained use of force by states and non-state actors is contributing to undermining and calling into question the collective security framework. Militarised revisionist powers are directly attacking this framework, thereby directly undermining the security environment of France and Europe.

1.1 Hardening of coercive and revisionist positions

1.1.1 Russian Federation

20. In the years to come, and by 2030, the main threat to France and Europeans is the risk of open warfare against the heart of Europe. Indeed, in the context of the war of aggression against Ukraine, Russia has stepped up its hostile actions against France and its European partners beyond direct conflict: nuclear intimidation, interference in the information sphere, cyberattacks, sabotage, espionage, arbitrary detention of nationals, overflights of the territory of certain allies, attempts to interfere in electoral processes, hostile demonstrations against French and allied forces, and actions on national territory. These increasingly uninhibited destabilisation actions, together with Moscow's absolute priority of strengthening its armed forces, confirm Russia's confrontational approach towards France and its European partners.

21. At the same time, the escalation in Ukraine has been reflected in Russia's use of the full spectrum of its conventional capabilities in all areas and environments. In particular, the use of low-cost strike and defence saturation capabilities has become widespread[1] and regularly targets civilian infrastructure and populations in a strategy of mass terror that amounts to war crimes. It has also resulted in the unprecedented use on the battlefield of a dual-capability intermediate-range ballistic missile ("Orechnik"), the internationalisation of the conflict with the presence of North Korean combat forces on the front line, the supply of lethal weapons, including ballistic missiles and low-cost drones, by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and a growing desire to involve China. The revision of Russia's nuclear doctrine, as well as the nuclear threats issued by Moscow, also attested to the continued misuse of nuclear weapons for coercion rather than deterrence.

22. Moscow has stepped up its attempts to discourage France and its allies from maintaining or increasing their military support for Ukraine. Russia has tested the determination of Kyiv's allies to respond, confirming in an increasingly aggressive manner its ambition to weaken and disarm Europe, decouple transatlantic ties and subjugate its neighbours, which are also those of the French and Europeans. Russia's objectives remain maximalist and ideological, and its methods unrestrained, both in Ukraine and in other European countries (Belarus, the Western Balkans, Moldova), including members of the European Union. They pose an unprecedented and lasting threat to the interests of France and Europe. Russia itself describes Europe as an enemy, is stepping up explicit and direct threats against it, and claims to be in a state of quasi-conflict with it.

23. In addition, the Kremlin has considerably expanded its aggressive influence policy, particularly in Africa, where strategic competition has intensified, in the Middle East and beyond (Latin America and Asia). Russia has activated and strengthened its levers for hostile action, particularly hybrid ones, and in new areas (the Arctic and the High North, outer space, the seabed, etc.).

[1] This modus operandi has also been observed in other recent conflicts.

24. It has strengthened its partnerships with China, Iran and North Korea to consolidate its imperialist and revisionist stance, primarily in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine, but also beyond, while developing its relations with other actors.

25. Russia is pursuing its ambition to challenge the international order and its existing security framework. It aims to return to spheres of influence, or even imperialist logic of vassalage, and to this end is targeting Western societies and models, including by exploiting their internal debates.

26. Finally, Moscow is continuing its rearmament with the aim of increasing its army by 300,000 soldiers, 3,000 tanks and 300 combat aircraft by 2030. Its military spending accounts for nearly 40% of its budget.

1.1.2 Islamic Republic of Iran

27. As part of its strategy of revisionist Islamist revolutionary power, the Islamic Republic of Iran has continued its regional and international destabilisation activities by supporting Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis, attempting to expand its influence in Africa through religious diplomacy and exporting technology and weapons. Iran's regional and national conventional power strategies, developed over the past two decades for deterrence purposes, were all activated in a logic of indirect regional war after 7 and 8 October 2023, further destabilising the entire region (Israel and Palestinian territories, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and even Turkey). These actions, together with the pursuit of its ballistic, regional destabilisation and nuclear programmes, without any civilian justification and in defiance of its past and present obligations and commitments (the Vienna Agreement on Iran's nuclear programme – JCPoA[2], the comprehensive safeguards agreement), have led to the most serious direct confrontation in the Middle East in twenty years.

28. This high-intensity direct war between Israel (supported by the United States) and Iran has reinforced the weakening of the Islamic Republic at the regional level (already largely underway with the weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas, and the fall of Bashar al-Assad) and internally (rapid deterioration of economic and social conditions, political divisions), which further increases the risk of the regime rushing headlong into repression and security measures. Tehran could indeed be tempted to relaunch a clandestine military nuclear programme without any international oversight in order to guarantee the regime's survival and security, and to strike at the interests of Western countries (state hostage policy, violent actions, etc.).

1.2 Tougher stance by the People's Republic of China

29. China sees its deep and multidimensional rivalry with the United States as inevitable. This rivalry is set to continue, regardless of how bilateral relations evolve. For Beijing, the goal is to surpass the United States as the world's leading power by 2050, coinciding with the centenary of the founding of the People's Republic of China.

30. The growing sophistication and intensity of military exercises around Taiwan, the continued pursuit of its fait accompli strategy in the South China Sea, and the rapid development of its civilian and military capabilities, both conventional and nuclear, have demonstrated China's increasing assertiveness. In 2024 and 2025, repeated Chinese military manoeuvres around Taiwan, on an unprecedented scale, marked a clear acceleration in the strengthening of China's military capabilities. China could also increase pressure on Taiwan by means other than military force. The regional situation is particularly dangerous and volatile in a context marked by uncertainty over the security guarantees provided by the United States to its Asian allies and partners.

31. At the same time, China has greatly accelerated its technological development, particularly in advanced defence technologies (quantum technologies, artificial intelligence (AI) and space). To

[2] Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed in 2015.

support these developments, China is exploiting an unprecedented range of hybrid actions, including cyber operations and scientific and technological predation.

32. In Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, China has deployed military assets, built economic ties, and mobilised its diplomacy in support of a clientelist strategy. It has also sought to promote an alternative security framework and to invest in multilateral forums as part of its own strategy to restructure global governance.

33. Its bilateral military cooperation with Russia has continued to develop. China considers Russia to be a major long-term strategic partner, particularly in order to present a united front in the changing balance of power. It directly facilitates Russia's war effort in Ukraine.

1.3 The central role of nuclear weapons in the assertion of power

34. The strategic environment is characterised by the reaffirmed centrality of nuclear weapons in the power game, as a result of three parallel developments: the destabilising actions of certain nuclear-armed states; nuclear proliferation crises ; and the unravelling of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control instruments, which cannot halt these worrying trends.

35. As part of its strategic intimidation posture, Moscow has announced the suspension of the *New START*[3] treaty on strategic arms control between the United States and Russia, raising the risk that there will be no limits on the world's two largest nuclear arsenals. Russia has also withdrawn from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT[4]), demonstrating its willingness to sacrifice the collective security framework in favour of its revisionist ambitions. Russia's strategic posture of intimidation is not limited to rhetoric alone but is also backed by nuclear signalling, including missile launches, exercises, and announced deployments in Belarus, as well as by a revised doctrine introduced in November 2024. Finally, the Kremlin is modernising its nuclear capabilities and is seeking to acquire disruptive, asymmetric systems that could undermine the concept of deterrence.

36. In the face of Russia's strategy, nuclear deterrence has fully played its role, limiting the expansion of the conflict in Ukraine and preserving the freedom of action of Western nations, who have thus been able to provide substantial support to Ukraine.

37. In line with the 2022 assessment, China has continued its significant expansion of its nuclear arsenal across all components of its triad, while consistently reaffirming its no-first-use doctrine. It is also the only permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT[5]) that has not declared a moratorium on the production of fissile material. Beijing is thus positioning itself to have a thousand nuclear warheads by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035. At the same time, China has continued to develop its ballistic capabilities (310 ballistic missile tests in 2024, firing an intercontinental ballistic missile with a claimed range of 12,000 km in the Pacific from Hainan) and its strategic signalling mainly towards Taiwan and the United States.

38. Nuclear proliferation has accelerated. As for North Korea, Pyongyang is continuing to develop its nuclear weapons, particularly tactical weapons, and in 2022 adopted a doctrine envisaging first-strike scenarios. The likely technological support from Russia gives it greater leverage.

39. The Islamic Republic of Iran has developed its own nuclear programme, which has reached unprecedented levels[6]. Successive military interventions by Israel and then the United States have severely limited Iran's ability to acquire a nuclear weapon in the short term. Tehran's decision to abandon any desire to acquire nuclear weapons or, conversely, its determination to rebuild

[3] Signed in 2010 and entered into force in 2011.

[4] Signed in 1996, not entered into force.

[5] Signed in 1968, entered into force in 1970.

[6] See statement by Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 3 March 2025.

facilities and resume its programme will have a significant impact on the security of the European continent, the stability of the Middle East and the risks of cascading proliferation.

40. Furthermore, the precedent set by Russia's irresponsible use of offensive nuclear rhetoric to wage war in Ukraine also increases the risk of proliferation. The perception of weakening US security guarantees could also prompt some partners to reconsider the nuclear option.

41. The proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons, as well as their delivery systems, particularly ballistic missiles, has also continued.

42. Finally, the major arms control treaties and mechanisms inherited from the Cold War are no longer operational. The New START treaty will expire in 2026, while the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was violated and subsequently abandoned. The non-proliferation architecture has been increasingly weakened due to growing polarisation between nuclear-armed states and those without nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the strategic environment is not conducive to further progress on nuclear disarmament, due in particular to the worsening proliferation crises in Iran and North Korea. The questioning of export control regimes by some states is also contributing to this. At the same time, efforts to ban nuclear weapons, notably those carried out under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), have undermined strategic stability by calling into question the central role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

1.4 Proliferation of conflicts and regional fragilities

43. While the generational challenge posed by authoritarian, revisionist powers remains central, France and its partners are also facing other equally significant, structural threats.

44. In their attempts to reshape the international order to their advantage or to counter the influence of their competitors, some states have instrumentalised certain regional conflicts, triggering a convergence of interests between actors that were once geographically, and even ideologically, distant. This has resulted in unprecedented interconnections between conflict zones. Far from being solid alliances, these connections are based on short-term interests that are themselves subject to power relations and domination.

45. Anti-Western attitudes in certain countries around the world and the dynamics of multi-alignment have grown stronger. However, divergent interests on a number of major issues remain. The emergence of genuine anti-Western coalitions of revisionist powers, beyond the closer ties between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, remains unlikely.

46. Furthermore, the accumulation of crises has increased the likelihood of escalation scenarios and the emergence of large-scale disruptive factors. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East are adding to other overlapping and intertwined crisis hotspots: South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan); Asia (Taiwan Strait, Korean Peninsula, South China Sea, Myanmar); Africa (Great Lakes, Darfur, Sahel, Horn of Africa). Tensions in North Africa have also increased (breakdown of diplomatic relations between Morocco and Algeria).

47. Finally, on the immediate periphery of the European Union (Belarus, the Balkans, Moldova), Russian actions have heightened security tensions in the region.

1.4.1 The Middle East after 7 October

48. The conflagration in the Middle East following the mass terrorist attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023 marked a strategic breakdown in the regional balance and had unprecedented and long-term humanitarian and security consequences for all states and populations in the region.

49. Following these attacks, which represent an existential trauma for Israel, Israel's strategic calculations have shifted in favour of a military and security-driven approach to regional challenges. This dynamic has led to a breakdown of the status quo across the different Middle Eastern theatres,

increasing the risk of escalation and regional war. Between 2023 and 2025, clashes between Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran intensified in a general indirect regional war involving all of Tehran's military partners. On two occasions, in 2024 and then in 2025, this confrontation took the form of direct warfare. In Lebanon, Israel's unilateral action contributed to the weakening of Hezbollah and Iran to a degree not seen since the 1970s, and to a political and security realignment in the country.

50. As for Syria, the regime change is the result of, among other things, Russia's disengagement, accompanied by an increase in Israeli strikes, the inability of the Islamic Republic of Iran, under strong regional pressure, to assume sole responsibility for safeguarding the Assad regime, and Turkey's support for the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group. As a result, a central element of the regional system built by the Islamic Republic of Iran over the past 20 years has disappeared.

51. The events of 7 October demonstrated that the unresolved Palestinian question remains a source of regional crisis. The worsening of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the dire situation in Gaza, and the accelerating settlement activity in the West Bank have further undermined the prospects for a just and lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians based on a two-state solution. This situation poses a threat to security and stability in the Levant. In this context, the normalisation process between Israel and certain Arab countries, under the framework of the Abraham Accords, has slowed.

52. In the Red Sea, the Houthis have intensified their destabilising actions targeting commercial vessels and Israel, using the Palestinian question for political leverage.

1.4.2 Africa

53. In Africa, security challenges (including terrorism, trafficking, organised crime, and intercommunal violence) as well as demographic and migration-related issues (such as diasporas) have not diminished.

54. In North Africa, relations between France and Algeria remain subject to periods of tension and carry security implications.

55. In sub-Saharan Africa, the rejection by certain countries of Western security partnerships, including those offered by France, along with the rapidly evolving geopolitical context, has led France to accelerate the restructuring of its security arrangements. The strategic competitors, who have carried out well-prepared anti-French campaigns, have taken advantage of the questioning of Western influence to reinforce their infiltration and predatory strategies without regard for regional stability, particularly the growing terrorist threat, which is once again rising after a decade in which it had been contained or reduced.

56. Finally, in East and Central Africa, the lack of lasting solutions to crises, the paralysis of multilateral security mechanisms and the self-serving involvement of foreign actors have led to humanitarian crises that increase the risk of regional conflagrations. This has been particularly evident in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Horn of Africa has not been spared (growing tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia).

1.5 Transnational threats

1.5.1 Jihadist-inspired terrorist threat

57. The ongoing reconfigurations in the Middle East and Africa, particularly since 7 October 2023 and the regional war that followed, have led to the activation of a larger number of individuals inspired by Islamist movements on national territory. They have also led to the resurgence of a foreign threat inspired by Qaida or Daesh that is likely to act.

58. At the same time, the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, a sanctuary for Daesh's Khorasan branch, where Central Asian and North Caucasian networks operate, has remained the main external terrorist threat to France.

1.5.2 Organised crime, cybercrime and trafficking

59. In France and Europe, the main criminal organisations have reached a critical size, financial power and structural agility that enable them to exploit the opportunities offered by globalisation, rapidly diversify their activities and operate on the basis of offering their criminal services. From safe havens or refuge states, they have developed transnational criminal activities, relying on human, logistical, and economic networks, and using corruption or coercion, including homicides and kidnappings, to achieve their objectives. The financial power of this globalised criminal activity is based on the development of a parallel, underground economy that exploits international financial networks and new tools such as cryptocurrencies, thereby contributing to the normalisation of a form of economic separatism. Drug trafficking remains the spearhead of these networks, which have expanded significantly to include human trafficking, kidnappings, organised fraud, trafficking in waste, protected species, works of art, and archaeological artefacts.

60. Finally, cybercrime[7] has grown on a massive scale, now affecting all sectors of society, including hospitals, local authorities, and small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs). Developing particularly in Russia, where it enjoys a certain degree of impunity, and fuelling an entire criminal ecosystem thanks to stolen personal data, this threat weighs heavily on France's economic development and undermines public confidence in digital technology.

1.5.3 Separatism and violent extremism

61. Protests of all kinds (political, ideological, etc.) have continued to develop, now incorporating increasingly violent forms of action (public disorder, sabotage, destruction, etc.). They can undermine the values of the Republic, public peace and tranquillity, and amplify communitarianism and insurrectionary or even separatist tendencies. These phenomena have been exacerbated by interference from certain state competitors and by the impact of social media, particularly in the overseas territories.

62. In addition, various conflicts (in the Middle East and Ukraine) have led to public disorder, resulting in community tensions or criminal acts (acts against certain religious communities, a sharp rise in anti-Semitic acts), potentially orchestrated by small groups or factions seeking to polarise opinion and thus threaten national cohesion. These disturbances have had a particular impact on young people.

1.6 Other cross-cutting security issues

1.6.1 Migration

63. A strengthening of mass population migration, accentuated by conflicts and crises, has been observed worldwide[8]. This phenomenon, already observed in overseas territories, particularly in Mayotte, has destabilised the functioning of certain public services (access to essential services such as housing, water, sanitation and healthcare). Given the international context and the impacts of climate change, it could become even more widespread.

64. The structural decline in humanitarian funding worldwide, accelerated by the ongoing withdrawal of the United States, has hampered the ability of humanitarian actors to meet the vital needs of

[7] Cybercrime is a form of organised crime that exploits cyberspace to defraud individuals or extort money from businesses.

[8] See in particular the 2024 International Migration Outlook report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

vulnerable populations, further weakening their situation and potentially triggering migration in order to survive. This trend particularly affects international organisations that are heavily dependent on US funding, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Food Programme.

65. These migratory phenomena have also been increasingly exploited by state and non-state actors (international organised crime). These actors use these means to exert pressure, increase their influence, or even for economic predation, intelligence gathering or destabilisation, particularly through the activation and control of diasporas present in Europe. Among them, Russia has deliberately directed migratory flows through its territory towards Northern Europe for the purpose of destabilisation.

1.6.2 Climate change, biodiversity collapse and health

66. Climate change has accelerated further, causing numerous natural disasters with significant security and economic ramifications (fires, floods, etc.). The work of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) has also confirmed the correlation between climate change and its impacts on populations and ecosystems. The effects of climate change have thus precipitated existential threats to certain territories (coastal areas, mountainous areas, overseas territories) and may eventually cause the partial or total disappearance of certain States and their exclusive economic zones (EEZs) as a result of rising sea levels (Maldives, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, etc.). These effects are reflected in the opening up of new shipping routes in the far north, but also in access to new resources that affect European interests.

67. In addition, environmental damage has increased, biodiversity has continued to decline and access to drinking water has become scarcer, with consequences for food sovereignty and security, public health and even regional tensions. The protection of natural areas, the environment, and living organisms, as well as the preservation of living conditions, are major concerns for future generations.

68. Climate change and globalisation are also contributing to the spread of endemic areas for certain pathogens (bacteria or viruses) and their vectors, such as mosquitoes that transmit tropical diseases, into regions historically spared, including mainland France. Already affected, the overseas territories are seeing an increase in the frequency of such epidemic outbreaks.

69. Furthermore, with the resurgence of certain diseases and the risk of pandemics, the growing susceptibility to dogmatic theories that are not supported by science (such as those developed by anti-vaccination movements) poses a significant risk to populations and represents a major challenge. The weakening of the global health system and the decline in international funding for these issues are all the more worrying.

1.6.3 Demographics

70. Against a backdrop of declining global fertility rates, world population growth has continued to slow, with significant regional disparities. Two-thirds of the world's population already live in a country or region where fertility is below the replacement level. These developments are accompanied by other phenomena such as increasing urbanisation, particularly in Asia and Africa, and an acceleration of regional and international migration. Most developed countries, including France, have begun to experience historic population ageing and a gradual decline in the working-age population.

71. Overseas territories are facing particularly contrasting demographic trends. In the French West Indies, the ageing population poses a problem of generational renewal in many sectors, particularly agriculture, and is giving rise to new unmet needs. In French Guiana and French Polynesia, the challenges of integration and employment opportunities are pressing for a young and sedentary

population. The strong demographic growth in French Guiana, as in Mayotte, has been accentuated by migratory pressure from Brazil on the one hand, and from the Comoros, East Africa and the Great Lakes region on the other.

1.6.4 Economic challenges

72. The economic outlook outlined by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is pessimistic until at least 2026 (average anticipated growth of 3%, including 0.8% for the eurozone). Coupled with the fog of the current trade war and the level of debt in many countries, this situation complicates financial decisions for all economic actors (governments, businesses) at a time when they need to invest heavily in innovation, defence and infrastructure.

1.6.5 Energy and access to raw materials

73. The downward trend in oil prices since 2022 has accelerated in 2025. This will have mixed effects on Western economies while limiting the sources of funding for Russia's war effort.

74. Access to rare earths, minerals and critical metals is now the subject of open competition linked to industrialisation and the spread of advanced technologies, at a time when these resources are increasingly sought after, particularly to adapt to climate change. The concentration of rare earth refining capacity in China (70%) is also a source of vulnerability.

75. Global energy consumption has increased. This trend is set to continue, particularly in favour of the development of new technologies. Similarly, the revival of civil nuclear power projects will increase demand for uranium, while renewable energies, electromobility and digital technologies will increase demand for metals and rare earths.

2. Transatlantic solidarity and strategic stability under pressure

2.1 Transatlantic relations in a period of uncertainty

76. The election of Donald Trump has confirmed the new hierarchy of US foreign policy priorities, already largely established by previous administrations. The United States is pursuing a less predictable foreign policy, with potentially major consequences for alliances (particularly NATO), transatlantic relations, the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine and, more broadly, security in Europe, which is threatened by a combination of the Russian threat and American disengagement, as well as security in Asia. Beyond that, the United States is asserting differences in views and values with the Europeans.

77. A new cycle of US disengagement from European security is beginning, against a backdrop of US prioritisation of protecting its own territory, dealing with the power rivalry with China[9] and a more transactional approach to these issues. This shift, which has been announced for several years, reflects a lasting change in the US stance. The United States now expects its European allies to take on a substantially greater share of the collective defence effort. The European Union is also perceived as a commercial competitor to Washington.

78. The levers of American power are being fully used to serve a more protectionist agenda, accompanied by an almost systematic link between the economy (through tariffs or demands for trade-offs) and security. This is accelerating the trend towards fragmentation of the global economy, with not only the risk of trade wars but also the growing use of economic security tools aimed at maintaining the United States as the world's leading economic power, such as extraterritorial measures.

[9] China is considered by the United States to be its only major competitor, or "*one peer competitor*".

2.2 Accelerated disintegration of security frameworks

79. The international collective security framework established after 1945, already weakened since 2014, has deteriorated significantly since February 2022. Russia's deliberate challenge to European security has accelerated the breakdown of Europe's security and arms control architecture, and has dismantled the European order based on the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter, and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The UN Security Council remains capable of overcoming its divisions and taking action on a number of issues, but the increasing use of the veto since 2022 has hampered this capacity, while some of its permanent members are directly involved in the erosion of UN modes of action. Major treaties and tools for conventional arms control have been weakened or are no longer operational with the suspension of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE[10]) and the Russian and US withdrawals from the Treaty on Open Skies[11]. The proliferation of crises has also fuelled an increased risk of small arms proliferation, further contributing to this weakening.

80. At the same time, the normalisation of practices that challenge, circumvent and exploit the international order based on multilateralism and the rule of law has worsened. The effectiveness of multilateral regimes to combat the spread of sensitive or proliferating technologies has been undermined from within. Attempts by our adversaries to impose new standards reflect a desire to weaken the applicable normative framework and to extricate themselves from accountability mechanisms.

2.3 Europe's strategic awakening

81. Since the start of Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine in February 2022, European mobilisation has reached a scale that was unimaginable before the outbreak of the conflict. The publication of the Strategic Compass that same year and the White Paper on European Defence in March 2025 illustrate the increased responsibility taken by Europeans for a step change in their ability to defend the continent. In this context, support for Ukraine in the face of Russia has remained the immediate strategic priority for almost all Europeans. Since the start of the conflict, the EU, its Member States and, more broadly, all Europeans have provided massive budgetary support, enabling Kyiv's economic (financial assistance measures) and military resilience (dedicated tools such as the European Peace Facility – EPF), including through the use of interest from frozen Russian assets. Mandated by its Member States, the European Union has adopted an unprecedented number of sanctions regimes targeting Russia's war effort and its destabilising actors.

82. Progress made in recent years on resilience, through the Critical Entities Resilience Directive (CER) and the NIS2 Directive on information network security, as well as on European defence, has continued. In particular, Europeans have secured their strategic supply routes in the Red Sea through Operation ASPIDES, provided over €134 billion in assistance to Ukraine, and regained sovereign access to space with Ariane 6.

83. Europe's capacity for action has been strengthened. Specific efforts have focused on establishing dedicated funding and developing a more competitive and autonomous European industry, particularly in the defence sector with initiatives such as ASAP[12] to support ammunition production, and EDIRPA[13] for joint procurement. Europeans have also continued their efforts to diversify energy supplies and reduce their dependence on Russia to the greatest extent possible.

84. Cooperation efforts at European level have also been strengthened, with the deepening of long-term sectoral partnerships in their political dimensions (the Weimar triangle, the " coalitionof the

[10] Signed on 19 November 1990.

[11] Entered into force on 1 January 2002.

[12] Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP).

[13] European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act.

willing" format in support of Ukraine, the *ad hoc* E3 and E5 formats[14], etc.) and capability partnerships with France (ELSA initiative[15] for long-range strikes, future air combat system – SCAF, main land combat system – MGCS, motorised capability – CaMo, etc.) but also without France (*Global Combat Air* Programme – GCAP, Rheinmetall-Leonardo cooperation on land, TKMS-Leonardo on submarines). In the military domain, these efforts have notably materialised with the CJEF[16] reaching full operational capability in 2023, along with progress on the European Intervention Initiative (EI2).

3. Expansion of areas of conflict, simultaneous and intertwined crises

3.1 Expansion of areas of conflict and intertwined crises

85. The expansion of areas of conflict, particularly in the information space and more broadly in shared spaces, is the subject of increasingly unrestrained and brutal competition between powers. This competition takes various forms, ranging from competition to contestation to confrontation, and has led to the use of intimidation and even coercion in all areas. The weaponisation of global issues (food, energy, water rights, resources) for offensive strategies, below the estimated threshold for triggering open war, has continued. The proliferation of so-called hybrid actions[17] targeting France and its allies and partners has further increased.

86. The conflicts and crises that have arisen over the past three years have also had an immediate impact at the national level and in political debate. The intertwining of external and internal issues has become more pronounced.

3.2 Increased use of hybrid strategies

87. Since 2022, France's adversaries have been openly using hybrid strategies that undermine its interests and those of its partners and allies. Geopolitical power relations have contributed to the growing use of strategic subversion and the systematisation of disinformation in international relations.

88. Hostile power strategies combine digital foreign interference operations and, more broadly, information manipulation, manipulation of historical memory, media control, and influence networks, including interference, the instrumentalisation of technologies and infrastructure, and aggressive infiltration tactics. Subversive attacks have sought to damage France's image (as during the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games), polarise public opinion around divisive issues, undermine national cohesion and ultimately attempt to break the bond of trust between citizens and the institutions responsible for representing them. As the leading power posing hybrid threats, Russia has orchestrated various operations targeting France, attempting to create internal divisions in society by specifically targeting our national symbols and history: anti-Semitic graffiti, fake soldiers' coffins under the Eiffel Tower, etc. This is part of its declared and unrestrained hostility towards Europe, linked to European support for Ukraine and the Russian government's ideological rejection of its democratic model. This has also led to an increase in the level of violence of attacks in Europe (sabotage, targeted assassinations or attempts against senior political, military or industrial figures, etc.), coupled with nuclear intimidation and conventional aggression.

[14] The E3 format includes Germany, France, and the United Kingdom; the E5 format adds Italy and Poland.

[15] European Long-Range Strike Approach.

[16] Combined Joint Expeditionary Force.

[17] These hybrid strategies are characterised in particular by the combination of cyber-attacks, information manipulation, the instrumentalisation of law (or "lawfare") and the economy, and the use of military operations. For France, a hybrid strategy refers to the use by a foreign actor of an integrated and deliberately ambiguous combination of military and non-military, direct and indirect, legal and illegal modes of action that are difficult to attribute. Playing with the estimated thresholds for retaliation and armed conflict, this combination is designed to constrain and weaken France and its partners.

89. In overseas territories, particularly in New Caledonia and the French Indies, but also in Mayotte, this type of action has developed in various and evolving forms, through the opportunistic exploitation (notably by Russia) of aspirations for greater autonomy, fuelled by recurring socio-economic issues. In French Guiana, Russia has shown increased interest in European launchers at the Guiana Space Centre (CSG). In the Melanesian sub-region, China is focusing its influence efforts on New Caledonia, due to its strategic location and nickel resources.

90. Online platforms have played an increasingly worrying role in this context. They are no longer just vectors but also actors in digital interference in elections (Romania, Germany).

91. In the field of cyberattacks, the main threats come from actors known to be linked to China, Russia and criminal actors affiliated with strategic competitors. These threats have mainly taken the form of espionage, data theft, the use of ransomware and denial-of-service attacks. The Russian Federation and certain actors believed to be linked to China represent a sophisticated and systemic cyber threat in this area. Sabotage by Russia in France and Europe has been observed in this area.

92. The proliferation of cyber intrusion tools linked to the rise of an unregulated market and their use by malicious actors, whether state-sponsored or not, has heightened the threat to the stability of cyberspace and national security. The uninhibited use of artificial intelligence (AI) in cyber-attacks poses a clear risk of proliferation in this area.

93. Digital infrastructures and the data they carry have now become both a target, a battleground, and a tool of conflict. The war in Ukraine illustrates their critical importance. Moreover, the interdependence between electrical and digital infrastructure has created a vulnerability that has steadily increased in recent years.

94. At the same time, shared spaces (airspace, very high altitudes, exo-atmospheric and extra-atmospheric space[18], the deep seabed, and maritime areas) have become the focus of renewed competition. The stakes surrounding unrestricted access to maritime routes and airspace have grown, as hostile actors increasingly employ deliberate, and at times hybrid, anti-access strategies.

95. Since 2022, space, both a theatre of strategic competition between major powers and a fully-fledged domain of operations, has seen a growing risk of uncontrolled escalation, driven by the increase in unfriendly, ambiguous, or even hostile behaviours, the development of offensive satellites, and sophisticated military satellite constellations.

96. Very high altitude, a largely unregulated domain, is now being actively exploited by competitors, as demonstrated by the deliberate overflight of at least one Chinese stratospheric balloon over the United States in 2023.

97. Finally, the threat of hostile actions on the deep seabed has increased significantly, targeting energy and information infrastructure, some of which is considered critical.

3.3 The expansion of geographical areas of conflict

98. Conflict has spread to all geographical areas in both tangible and intangible forms, with the aim of controlling natural resources, flows (energy, communications) and trafficking.

99. In recent years, these developments have accentuated transactional and predatory behaviour, as well as regional tensions and tensions between major powers. The geography of producers, supply routes for energy, and other flows has shifted, disrupting established balances.

100. In particular, the war in Ukraine has marked the end of a certain Arctic exception, a space that had remained relatively free of geopolitical rivalries since 1991, especially between Russia, China, and the United States. Climate change and the dramatic melting of the polar ice have turned this region

[18] Successively, from the ground to an altitude of 20 km, from approximately 20 km to 100 km, from approximately 100 km to 700 km and above 700 km.

into a new contested space, due to the opening of new maritime routes, access to previously unreachable resources, and prospects for new underwater infrastructure.

101. As both areas of economic recovery for France and the European Union and territories where organised criminal networks have established themselves, France's overseas territories (particularly the French West Indies and French Guiana) are particularly vulnerable to these developments. Located in strategic areas with high stakes, they are exposed to Sino-American competition in the Indo-Pacific, to manoeuvres to control international migration routes, and to organised crime. Some of these territories are also the subject of regional disputes that could be exploited by adversaries.

3.4 Instrumentalisation of the economy and standards

102. The use of the economy as a strategic weapon has been increasingly asserted since 2022. Given their weight in international trade, recent developments in China (Export Control Law) and the United States (Export Administration Regulations – EAR, Foreign Direct Product Rule – FDPR) have had a systemic impact. Some countries have systematically resorted to coercive measures that undermine the principles of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in order to constrain the political or commercial actions of another state. This coercion takes various forms depending on the objectives: direct and frontal, it aims to weaken a state in a non-discriminatory manner; indirect, it targets a state's dependencies and aims to weaken certain companies or economic sectors (rare earths, market share, critical components).

103. In the Pacific region and beyond, China's economic investment strategy has been accompanied by a desire to extend its political influence. Furthermore, in overseas territories, given their potential attractiveness and the gateway to the European market that they represent, offers from foreign players are subject to particular vigilance in the strategic areas of telecommunications (satellite networks, submarine cables), energy (photovoltaics) and mining.

3.5 A technological shift that presents Europe with new challenges

104. The acceleration of innovation has been unprecedented since the last strategic review. Europeans face the challenge of staying in the technological and industrial race, which lies at the heart of the Sino-American rivalry. The challenge for France and Europe is to foster the emergence of champions, close the gap, export innovative technologies, and actively promote our norms and standards.

105. In the military field, this acceleration affects both extremes of technology: efficient models now combine high-tech devices with rustic, less expensive and consumable capabilities. These developments can be seen in Ukraine and the Middle East, where they have already transformed the nature of conflict, with the growing industrialisation of low-cost equipment (drones) and high-tech capabilities (cruise missiles, manoeuvrable ballistic missiles, command systems), which are transforming the dynamics of escalation and removing inhibitions on the use of mass violence in war, including against civilian infrastructure and populations.

106. The use of artificial intelligence (AI) has expanded exponentially. In the military sphere, this technology has increasingly established itself as a transformative force, particularly in targeting and strike operations. Its use by both state and non-state actors has also accelerated in support of hybrid strategies, representing both a levelling force in technological terms and a clear risk of proliferation in the short term.

107. In this context, scientific, technological and industrial competition has further accelerated. This has resulted in the establishment of control tools, exploited by certain states, against a backdrop of Sino-American rivalry. Thus, the fragmentation of the global economy has continued, driven by the determined pursuit of spheres of influence, illustrated by the concentration of dominant

transnational companies in the field of emerging advanced technologies, such as Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft (GAFAM), OpenAI, Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Huawei, Xiaomi (BATHX), DeepSeek, NVIDIA and TSMC). The dominant position of large platforms (hyperscalers) leads to dependencies on their solutions. Their ability to guide and promote content also creates a risk of cognitive manipulation.

108. Reducing technological, industrial, and commercial dependencies on foreign suppliers has become a global sovereignty priority. This has been reflected in access to strategic raw materials and resources, and in the technological race, within a context of accelerating breakthroughs and innovations, such as generative artificial intelligence, mRNA technologies, pharmaceuticals, and quantum technologies. As a result, the constraints on French and European ambitions have been further reinforced.

109. Europe, already facing the risk of a dual decline in growth and research and development efforts, is also confronted with intensified attempts at appropriation since 2022: the capture of its digital data, scientific and entrepreneurial talent, the looting of its knowledge, its personal data and the targeting of its consumers. French universities, research centres and laboratories have been particularly targeted by foreign interference attempts aimed at destabilising society and institutions and undermining academic freedom.

110. Finally, France and EU Member States have implemented policies to support strategic sectors, promote reindustrialisation and protect sensitive material and intangible assets. However, the lack of sufficient European capital, both public and private, has left companies vulnerable to predatory investment strategies by external actors, particularly targeting the most innovative start-ups seeking funding.

Consequences for France, Europe and the international order

111. The acceleration of global strategic change has major consequences for France, its allies and partners in Europe and around the world.

1. Europeans facing the risk of war and strategic isolation

112. The prospect of French armed forces taking part in a major high-intensity war near Europe, combined with the risk of simultaneous destabilising hybrid actions against France's internal security, has reached an unprecedented level since the end of the Cold War. However, the threat of a major conventional war on the mainland national territory is not considered credible.

113. The reality of the Russian threat is now unprecedented for the interests of France and Europe. The Kremlin regularly and consistently refers to France and Europeans as enemies in its official statements. The prioritisation of this threat, which is likely to be generational, places Europe in a long-term confrontation imposed by Russia, beyond the aggression against Ukraine. The possibility of a new Russian attack against Europe within the next three to five years is central to the defence and security interests of the European continent. Indeed, there is no indication that the Russian president will deviate from his policy of aggression and ideological hostility in the name of his vision of an "eternal Russia" fighting against the supposed hegemony of the "decadent West" or from his claim to guardianship over territories hosting Russians or Russian speakers. Further offensives against Ukraine, in neighbouring Moldova, in the Balkans or even against NATO Member States, to test the Alliance's cohesion, are possible. The greatest risk would be that such aggression could coincide with a major operation elsewhere in the world, diverting US forces.

114. As such, the outcome of the Ukrainian conflict is of major importance for Europe. Its future security depends on it. Continued support, particularly military support, for Ukraine therefore requires an ambitious European response. The preservation of European interests will also depend on the terms of a lasting and just peace in Ukraine, based on respect for international law.

115. The rapprochement brought about by North Korea and Iran's direct military support for Russia directly affects the security of France and Europe, but also has destabilising consequences in the Middle East and Asia in terms of countervailing capabilities. Chinese support for Russia's defence industrial and technological base also contributes to the growing interconnection between theatres of operation.

116. These elements are part of a battle of ideas that is bringing to the fore certain deep ideological convergences that have targeted the very model of liberal democracy and humanism on which Europe has been built since 1945. These dynamics have notably materialised through common voting positions at the United Nations. France, for its part, reaffirms its commitment to these principles, to respect for international law and to the defence of human rights.

117. The possibility of crisis management and conflict with greatly reduced US support is now clearly apparent to Europeans. The role of France, the only EU member state with nuclear weapons and a major contributor to European security, is to be the driving force behind European strategic rearmament.

118. For most European allies, this development constitutes a paradigm shift that would be accelerated by a rapid and brutal withdrawal of the United States from the protection of the continent.

119. These factors highlight the risks of Europe's strategic isolation, calling into question the need for a more centred approach to defending shared interests and mutual dependencies, which are the pillars of greater effectiveness and genuine European strategic autonomy.

120. Investment to strengthen European autonomy and sovereignty is therefore essential. European countries are now faced with the challenge of scaling up their defence and building a European security system that is structurally resilient to geopolitical developments.

121. However, NATO remains the only organisation with the credibility, structures, mechanisms and legitimacy necessary to collectively address a major conflict on the European continent. Greater responsibility for Europeans within NATO, coordination between the EU and NATO, and strategic convergence between willing European countries are essential.

122. In this context, partnerships are particularly important for France, notably for building ad hoc coalitions to pursue priority objectives (strategic, capability, migration, demographic, economic and climate).

123. Finally, the European Political Community (EPC) provides a useful broader framework for addressing these security challenges.

2. The nuclear factor at the heart of power relations

124. The fundamentals of France's deterrence doctrine remain fully appropriate. However, changes in the strategic environment call for ensuring the relevance of the capability choices made to arm strategic forces and the appropriate sizing of their conventional support.

125. These developments also reinforce the need to "open the strategic debate on the protection of our allies on the European continent through our deterrence[19]".

126. The risk of a new wave of proliferation combined with the breakdown of arms control treaties and norms is a major challenge for France and Europe.

3. The challenge of regional realignments for French and European interests

127. In the Middle East, the security risk posed by Iran is the main strategic challenge for France and Europe. The lack of a political settlement to the various crises in the region, particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, reinforces this risk. Houthi attacks directly undermine freedom of navigation and harm our interests and those of our partners.

128. Instability in the Levant, particularly the uncertainty in Syria, has brought jihadist terrorism back to the forefront of non-state threats to France. The persistent threat of Daesh and terrorist attacks in France and Europe is now significant.

129. The proliferation of crisis hotspots in sub-Saharan Africa, now embedded in strategic competition between major powers, is also leading to the resurgence of the jihadist threat and major transnational threats (organised crime, including drug trafficking, arms trafficking and illegal immigration). The intensification of the jihadist threat in West Africa is also a security challenge for Europe.

130. Russia, but also other competitors of France, are exploiting the instability of the African continent to promote their interests or harm those of France or Europe. Some are offering an alternative model of cooperation and relations, without any concessions on domestic policy or human rights. If the convergence of their influence strategies remains limited, they could seek to coordinate on a case-by-case basis and seize the opportunity presented by the questioning of partnerships with France or European countries to strengthen their footprint and their infiltration.

131. In this regard, the reorganisation of France's military presence in Africa paves the way for renewed, broader and more agile partnerships based on the needs expressed by its partners. In conjunction

[19] Address by the President of the French Republic to the French people on 5 March 2025.

with its allies and like-minded countries, France can continue to capitalise on its experience to position itself as a privileged partner by offering a competitive and tailored package.

132. Similarly, the possible proliferation of crisis theatres in the Indo-Pacific calls into question France's ability to strike the right balance between strategic signalling and pre-positioning, particularly in the context of a forced strategic refocusing on the European theatre. Despite the difficulties inherent in the Indo-Pacific region (distance from France, logistical challenges), maintaining a capacity for action in this theatre is essential in view of French interests (overseas populations and territories, partnerships).

4. Security risks that undermine democracies

133. Security challenges are increasing, while the threat of jihadist-inspired terrorism remains high. The accumulation of crises also comes amid other global challenges, particularly overseas (biodiversity collapse, climate change, pandemic risks, food crisis risks, increased migration, ageing population), which are putting pressure on government services. The intertwining of external and internal security issues is becoming more apparent due to the immediate resonance that certain emblematic crises have on the domestic scene. This requires a comprehensive response in terms of defence and national security, at a time when the risks to the fundamental interests of the Nation (IFN[20]) have never been so high since the end of the Cold War.

134. At the same time, the risks posed by all aspects of organised crime to these IFNs (particularly in overseas territories) are now significant (in terms of insecurity, public health, corruption, undermining the rule of law, etc.). They are further exacerbated by collusion between organised crime, terrorist networks and non-state groups engaged in hybrid strategies. This phenomenon is a destabilising factor for France and its partners. It undermines the economy and national solidarity and weakens national cohesion.

135. In this context, the possibility of major French military engagement outside national territory is closely linked to the strengthening of national security measures, operational interministerial coordination and, ultimately, the mobilisation of the entire nation.

136. Furthermore, the intertwining of areas of conflict and competition (information manipulation, the private sector, migration, cyberattacks, etc.) demonstrates the need for an integrated strategy to address them, in a broad sense of the concept of national security in its political, diplomatic, economic, military and domestic dimensions. The legal dimension also plays an essential role in countering the manoeuvres of competitors and protecting the interests of the Nation.

137. Finally, the proliferation of hybrid attacks with an increased subversive dimension has highlighted the need for Europeans to strengthen their capacity to protect themselves against such attacks and to impose a cost on their adversaries. They have also highlighted the need for ambitious strategies in the field of information and influence, backed by appropriate resources (information monitoring and counter-information mechanisms, defence and response, etc.).

5. Restricted freedom of action and projection

138. The robustness, sustainability and adaptability of France's sovereign capabilities to deal with all these threats and the rapid changes in the world determine its autonomy in decision-making and action.

139. The intensity of the conflicts observed in Ukraine and the Middle East confirms the relevance of having robust, credible first-entry[21] capabilities in areas where freedom of action is challenged by anti-access strategies, supported by diverse means and massed attacks using drones and missiles.

[20] Defined in article 410-1 of the French Criminal Code.

[21] First-entry refers to conducting decisive offensive operations independently in contested and defended territory or spaces.

140. In particular, the need for robust capabilities to suppress enemy defences, control the electromagnetic spectrum, conduct deep conventional strikes and provide ground-to-air protection (short, medium and long range) has been demonstrated.

141. High-intensity conflicts require the ability to operate as a framework nation across all domains. They also highlight the need for sufficient human and material resources to sustain long-term operations, as well as the ability to act within a coalition.

142. Finally, they serve as a reminder that the outcome of a war depends on having efficient and innovative industrial capabilities to supply the front with munitions and equipment, and to meet operational needs that must account for a certain level of attrition of deployed assets.

143. The widespread use in conflict zones of low-cost equipment (drones, remote-controlled munitions, electronic warfare systems, etc.), developed rapidly in response to changing tactical situations, means that these threats must be taken into account. It also demonstrates the usefulness of having effective anti-drone and anti-missile defence systems, as well as long-range strike capabilities to deter such attacks or, if necessary, to take the initiative. This use also highlights the tactical advantages of short-cycle weapons production capabilities. It requires France to be capable of managing major armament programmes while simultaneously leading short, agile, low-cost development cycles that make full use of civilian-derived, distributed and networked capabilities to support our armed forces.

144. NATO must transform itself. The possibility of a significant withdrawal of US capabilities from the European continent can no longer be ruled out and requires European allies to build credible capabilities in an approach guided by an ambitious European roadmap to ensure the resilience of the alliance and thereby counter the Russian threat and preserve peace in Europe.

145. Finally, reliable geographical footholds continue to play a key role in defending France's sovereign access to critical areas.

6. Economic and technological warfare

146. The acceleration of technological change is a critical issue for France and Europe. In particular, it is important to preserve France's position as an industrial and defence power, contributing to the strengthening of European defence, especially in the face of the United States and China, which are investing heavily in these areas. A delay in acquiring new technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, could lead to a major strategic downgrade for France and its European allies. This applies particularly to operational support. Mastery of robotics and a high degree of autonomy are essential across the entire data cycle.

147. In addition, Europe faces the challenge of mass-producing while continuing to innovate in areas such as AI, autonomous systems, quantum sensors, advanced electronic warfare, hypersonic technologies and directed energy. The relevance of an agile, resilient and long-term European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) based on the principle of European preference (design European, produce European, buy European) has been confirmed.

148. The growing intertwining of trade issues and security concerns is also an increasingly important factor in France's security: strategic dependencies now require us to anticipate the global economic risks inherent in any potential conflict, as in the case of Taiwan, a key link in the semiconductor supply chain. Reducing strategic dependencies is a real challenge, particularly for overseas territories, given their importance to France.

149. Securing access to resources, land and rare minerals is also at the heart of strategic competition and is an essential sovereignty issue for France and Europe. In particular, access to fossil fuels remains a major challenge in the medium term, against a backdrop of growing insecurity in production and maritime transit areas.

150. The dependence of national and European industry leaders on major digital players, whose capabilities (cloud, AI) are now essential to keep pace with innovations from other non-European manufacturers, is also a significant weakness.

151. Efforts by some non-European players to impose new standards are undermining the applicable regulatory framework and weakening the prospects for European strategic autonomy and industrial sovereignty.

152. Access to databases, particularly American ones, which contain a wealth of international data, is a challenge for French and European researchers.

153. Finally, the technological race is increasing the constraints on French and European technology industries and raising questions about the need for a long-term strategy to protect sensitive tangible and intangible assets through massive public and private investment.

7. Conclusion

154. The changing strategic environment therefore requires France to simultaneously adapt to the immediate emergency by accelerating its overall rearmament, prepare for the possibility of major high-intensity engagement near Europe by 2027–2030, accompanied by a significant increase in hybrid attacks on its territory, and begin preparing for the future to remain fully in control of its national and European destiny by 2040–2050.

2

AN UPDATED 2030 AMBITION, BACKED BY APPROPRIATE RESOURCES

Updated 2030 ambition

155. By 2030, France will be rearmed, materially and morally, to prevent, confront and win, alongside its allies and partners, a major high-intensity war near Europe, while also preventing and managing the consequences of simultaneous destabilising actions on national territory.

156. While continuing to seek political solutions, France will be capable of sustaining the balance of power over the long term with its strategic competitors and those of its partners. Resilient, it determines its own destiny. Its economy is self-sufficient in areas contributing to its strategic sovereignty. It has the means to operate across the full spectrum and respond to all types of threats.

157. It is one of the driving forces behind a Europe that is ready to defend itself, protect itself and cooperate to reduce its dependencies and vulnerabilities, so that it can continue to be a master of its own destiny in the long term (through to 2050) by defending its interests and the place of its model of society in the world. French and European scientific and technological excellence contribute to this. More broadly, France contributes to the security of its partners and defends universal principles and international law.

158. Furthermore, the State and the Nation are adapting in order to have all the necessary means to face up to the intensification of risks and threats, including those linked to organised crime and terrorism, which shows no sign of abating, as well as the hybrid strategies of our adversaries. France is implementing a comprehensive national defence and security model involving all public, private and civil society actors.

159. At the same time, the European pillar within the Atlantic alliance is being strengthened. Within Europe, Member States are equipping themselves with military, industrial and technological tools that reinforce the strategic autonomy of a Europe that embraces European preference and takes charge of its own defence.

160. This ambition is broken down into eleven strategic objectives. They contribute to the implementation of the six strategic functions redefined and expanded in the 2022 National Strategic Review (knowledge-understanding-anticipation, deterrence, protection-resilience, prevention, intervention, influence). These six strategic functions have proven their relevance in providing a comprehensive and coherent response to the increasingly intertwined defence and national security challenges observed since 2022.

161. Therefore, with its sovereign and credible ability to act, its adapted military model and its enhanced capacity for influence, France in 2030, will, in order of priority:

- protect and defend its mainland and overseas territories, its population, and its nationals through:
    - an independent, credible and consistent nuclear deterrent, the cornerstone of its defence policy, backed by robust conventional armed forces;
    - a defence posture tailored to the threats and involving the internal security forces, providing permanent protection for people, property, resources and the environment against a wide range of hostile actions, and capable of imposing a cost on its adversaries;
    - economic, technological, scientific and industrial security, including at European level, reinforced by simplified financial tools and programmes;
    - the mobilisation of its entire society, united, resilient and participating in its defence;
- contribute to the defence of Europe, including through its nuclear deterrence. It also has the capacity to engage in high-intensity conflict. It can act as a framework nation within a NATO, EU or ad hoc coalition in a major war scenario. It contributes in particular to the stability of its

eastern neighbourhood by encouraging the European integration process of Ukraine, Moldova and other candidate countries, and by developing an ambitious agenda with the countries of the southern Mediterranean;

- intervene to guarantee its security and defend its interests and those of its non-European allies, within the framework of renewed partnerships, in an area stretching from the Gulf of Guinea to the Indian Ocean, via the Horn of Africa;
- contribute, through its strengthened presence in overseas departments, regions and communities (DROM-COM), through projection operations from mainland France and with its partners, to the stability of the Indo-Pacific region. To do so, it relies on a network of strengthened support points.

162. It acts simultaneously, and within these four areas of operation, alongside its partners to ensure the security of shared spaces (cyber, space, seabed, airspace and maritime areas, polar regions) and supply routes, including those serving the French overseas territories (DROM-COM) given their strategic location and critical importance to national defence and security.

163. In all circumstances, and across all domains, it remains the supreme responsibility of the President of the Republic to constantly assess the nature of France's interests and any threats against them.

164. Eleven strategic objectives have been defined to achieve this ambition and help strengthen strategic functions:

- SO 1: A robust and credible nuclear deterrent;
- SO 2: A united and resilient France: contributing to the moral rearmament of the Nation to deal with crises;
- SO 3: An economy prepared for war;
- SO 4: First-class cyber resilience;
- SO 5: France as a reliable ally in the Euro-Atlantic area;
- SO 6: France as a driving force behind European strategic autonomy;
- SO 7: France as a reliable sovereignty partner and credible provider of security;
- SO 8: Guaranteed autonomy of assessment and decision-making sovereignty;
- SO 9: The ability to act across hybrid domains;
- SO 10: The ability to achieve decisive outcomes in military operations;
- SO 11: Supporting French and European sovereignty through academic, scientific and technological excellence.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1

A robust and credible nuclear deterrent

165. France possesses an independent, sovereign and legitimate nuclear deterrent, structured around two strategic components (ocean-based and air-based) whose renewal has been decided by the President of the Republic.

1. Fundamentals of the French doctrine

166. France's deterrence strategy is nuclear. It has been consistently and transparently reaffirmed, regardless of political changes. It is adapted in line with developments in the strategic environment, as reflected in the speeches of successive Presidents of the Republic. These speeches have been translated into the various Defence White Papers and strategic reviews, which together form the foundation of French doctrine. President Emmanuel Macron presented France's defence and deterrence strategy at the École de Guerre in a speech delivered on 7 February 2020, which is the current reference. Successive military programming laws passed by Parliament have reflected this long-term political determination, particularly in budgetary terms, and have ensured its implementation.

167. As a contest of wills, nuclear deterrence is above all the expression of political resolve, aimed at protecting France against any state-origin aggression targeting its vital interests, regardless of its source or form, whether nuclear or otherwise. Deterrence aims to influence the calculations and decisions of a state adversary in advance by making the potential aggressor fear unacceptable damage.

168. Nuclear deterrence is the ultimate guarantee of the Nation's security, protection and independence. France underlines the role and political nature of this weapon, whose use is the sole responsibility of the President of the Republic, elected by direct universal suffrage.

169. Deterrence aims to sow doubt in the mind of the adversary. This requires a careful balance between political determination to defend France's vital interests, doctrinal transparency and deliberate ambiguity regarding the exact circumstances in which the use of nuclear weapons could be considered.

1.1 A strictly defensive purpose

170. The use of nuclear weapons is conceivable and envisageable only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, and not for the purposes of conquest, aggression, coercion or consolidation of a military advantage: "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be waged[22]". Given the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, France affirms that as long as these weapons exist, they must be used strictly for defensive purposes, deterrence and the prevention of war.

[22] Joint statement by the Heads of State and Government of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the French Republic, the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, issued on 3 January 2022.

1.2 Vital interests

171. It is the sole responsibility of the President of the Republic to assess what these interests are. The choice to maintain deliberate ambiguity, reaffirmed by each President, complicates the calculations of any aggressor considering attacking France's interests and thereby discourages any attempts to circumvent deterrence.

1.3 The unique nature of nuclear weapons – unacceptable damage

172. The nature, extraordinary power, speed and effects of nuclear weapons make them unique and incomparable to any conventional weapon. It is these intrinsic characteristics that enable them to inflict instant and unacceptable damage. This capability imposes a level of risk that far outweighs any potential gains an aggressor might hope to achieve. In this contest of wills, it is that prospect which must deter any inclination towards aggression. Any use of nuclear weapons in a conflict would irreversibly and fundamentally alter its nature. This is why nuclear deterrence is unique and fundamentally different from any form of discouragement undertaken by conventional, political or economic means.

1.4 The nuclear warning

173. If a state adversary were to take the risk of attacking France, having misjudged the nature of its vital interests, a so-called nuclear warning strike could be carried out against them. Such a strike would be intended to send a clear message to the aggressor that the nature of the conflict has fundamentally changed and to restore the logic of deterrence by compelling them to abandon their ongoing acts of aggression against our country.

174. This nuclear warning is optional, singular and non-repeatable. It is not intended to achieve military dominance over an adversary, as the French nuclear weapon is in no way a battlefield weapon.

1.5 Strict sufficiency

175. France rejects any arms race. The level of French nuclear forces does not depend on the offensive capabilities, whether nuclear or conventional, of other states. France does not seek any form of parity. This level is determined solely by the ability of France’s nuclear forces to inflict unacceptable damage on any state that threatens France’s vital interests.

1.6 Permanence

176. French deterrence is exercised permanently thanks to the ability of nuclear forces to inflict unacceptable damage at any time. Permanence is based on the complementarity of the two nuclear components. The crews do not train to be ready: they are ready. Permanence is essential to the credibility of French deterrence. It prevents any strategic surprise and contributes to the freedom of action of the President of the Republic in all situations.

1.7 Mutual support between nuclear and conventional forces

177. France's defence strategy is a coherent whole in which nuclear and conventional forces support each other at all times. When vital interests are likely to be threatened, conventional military manoeuvres may be part of the exercise of deterrence. However, there is a fundamental difference between conventional operations and any possible use of nuclear weapons. Conventional forces expand France's ability to respond to threats and set the threshold for our deterrence at the appropriate level. The coherence of our military model strengthens France's ability to channel

adversarial aggression towards the lowest possible level of intensity. In this regard, the President of the Republic stated in his keynote speech at the École de Guerre in 2020: "The presence of robust conventional forces makes it possible to avoid strategic surprise, prevent the creation of a fait accompli or test the adversary's determination at the earliest possible stage by forcing them to reveal their true intentions. In this strategy, our nuclear deterrent force remains, as a last resort, the cornerstone of our security and the guarantee of our vital interests. Today, as in the past, it guarantees our independence and our freedom of judgement, decision and action. It prevents our adversaries from betting on the success of escalation, intimidation or blackmail".

178. More specifically, air and missile defence capabilities, along with deep conventional strike capabilities, both of which have grown significantly in importance at the European level since the war in Ukraine, are two of the pillars that will help expand this support.

1.8 Complementarity of components

179. France relies on a daily basis on the two complementary components of its nuclear forces: ocean-based and airborne. Both contribute to all deterrence missions. Their respective capabilities make them complementary by significantly complicating a potential adversary's calculations and the sizing of their defences. This complementarity also shields France's deterrent from unexpected technological breakthroughs in areas such as air defence, missile defence or submarine detection. Thanks to these two components, the Head of State has multiple and diverse options at his disposal to ensure the credibility of deterrence in all circumstances.

1.9 Renewal of strategic nuclear forces

180. Since 2017, France has been engaged in renewing its two nuclear components. The strategic oceanic forces are benefiting from a new increment of the M51 intercontinental ballistic missile, and construction of the third generation of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines has begun. The air-based nuclear component is equipped with an upgraded version of the ASMPA[23] missile and will, in the coming years, be equipped with a hypersonic, high-speed nuclear missile (ASN4G[24]).

2. French deterrence and Europe

181. France's deterrence policy must take into account changes in our strategic environment, our alliances and European integration. France has always considered that its deterrence has a European role[25], given the unique nature of European integration and the unwavering solidarity it has created between France and its European partners. The President of the Republic stated in February 2020 that "our nuclear forces play a unique deterrence role, particularly in Europe. They strengthen Europe's security by their very existence and, in this respect, have a genuinely European dimension. On this point, our independence of decision-making is fully compatible with unwavering solidarity towards our European partners. Our commitment to their security and defence is the natural expression of our ever-closer solidarity. Let me be clear: France's vital interests now have a European dimension." In March 2025, he reaffirmed that "in deciding what constitutes vital interests, the interests of our main partners will be taken into account".

182. Within the Atlantic Alliance, France, as a nuclear-weapon state, has a specific role to play and contributes to the definition of the Alliance's nuclear policy, without however participating in NATO's nuclear planning mechanisms. Like the United Kingdom, it embodies the existence within

[23] Improved medium-range air-to-surface missile.
[24] Fourth-generation air-to-surface nuclear missile.
[25] The Ottawa Declaration of 19 June 1974 already stated that the nuclear forces of France (and the United Kingdom) contributed significantly to the overall security of the Alliance. Similarly, the Chequers Declaration of 30 October 1995 also stated that France and the United Kingdom did not envisage a situation in which the vital interests of one party could be threatened without those of the other also being threatened.

the Alliance of multiple independent decision-making centres, complicating the calculations of any potential aggressor and contributing to NATO's overall deterrence.

183. Given the Russian threat and other potential or foreseeable risks, European states must be able to defend themselves better. In 2020, and again in 2024, France proposed to its European partners who so wish a strategic dialogue on the contribution of French nuclear deterrence to Europe's collective security. On 5 March 2025, the President of the Republic announced the opening of a strategic dialogue on the protection of our European allies through French deterrence. This dialogue is intended to be fully complementary to NATO's nuclear policy, without seeking to replace it. It will be based on three fundamental principles: (i) the decision to employ French nuclear deterrence will not be shared (the President of the Republic is its sole authority), (ii) French doctrine emphasises the strategic nature of the nuclear weapon, rejecting any notion of tactical use, and (iii) the offer made to Europeans will not come at the expense of the capabilities required for our national deterrence.

3. Preventing the arms race, dissemination and proliferation

184. France will work to preserve the centrality of the NPT in the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture and to promote a realistic and progressive approach to nuclear disarmament.

185. At the same time, the fight against nuclear proliferation remains a priority. France will therefore continue to mobilise to respond to proliferation crises and their potential consequences.

186. Political, technical and financial support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be maintained. The implementation of safeguard agreements and the universalisation of the Additional Protocol will be supported.

187. In parallel, France will strengthen existing frameworks for combating the proliferation and spread of weapons, including export control arrangements, conventions and international treaties. It will also contribute to efforts to promote the highest non-proliferation standards among its partners.

4. Promoting arms control

188. In the context of the disintegration of the security and arms control architecture, France will continue to support ambitious and verifiable strategic arms control agreements between the world's largest nuclear arsenals, in order to ensure strategic stability. It will reaffirm its commitment to strategic arms control instruments, including US-Russian agreements (such as New START), and to preserving existing political frameworks that ensure European strategic stability.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2

A united and resilient France: contributing to the moral rearmament of the nation to deal with crises

189. By 2030, France will guarantee its resilience[26] at all times and in all places, both in mainland France and the overseas territories. The major challenge will be to deal simultaneously with domestic crises, including pandemics, organised crime, riots and terrorism, and with hybrid actions by our competitors and adversaries on national soil. This will also require the ability to contribute to military efforts in the event of major engagement beyond national territory. This objective will concern the entire Nation, including public authorities, citizens, the business community, local authorities and associations).

1. Assessment of measures implemented since the 2022 National Strategic Review

190. Since its approval in April 2022, the National Resilience Strategy (NRS) has served as the interministerial roadmap for preparing the Nation to face crises. Initially structured around three pillars and 73 actions led by the ministries, this strategy has since been extended to citizens, local authorities and the business community. In three years, it has led to real progress: the Orion[27] exercise, the reform of national security planning and the introduction of the FR -Alert[28] system. It has also enabled all players to become acculturated to resilience by offering, for example, awareness-raising modules for elected representatives and training for public servants. Certain measures have provided an initial response to the risk of supply chain disruptions, including the decree on "medicines of major therapeutic interest" and the provisions of the Military Programming Law (LPM) relating to stockpiling requirements for companies in the Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DITB).

191. New work has been launched to focus the NRS on two priorities : the economic continuity of the life of the Nation and the commitment of citizens to the resilience of the Nation.

192. Alongside these national efforts, France has drawn on a dense network of alliances and partnerships, foremost among which are the EU and NATO, to strengthen its cooperation and coordination with its partners in the field of resilience.

[26] Resilience is defined as the willingness and ability of a country, society and government to withstand the consequences of a major attack or disaster, and then rapidly restore their ability to function normally, or at least in a socially acceptable manner. It concerns not only public authorities, but also economic actors and civil society as a whole.

[27] The aim of the Orion exercise is to prepare the armed forces for the most complex situations in modern warfare, involving players and entities beyond the military scope.

[28] Fr-Alert is the public alert and information system.

2. Action plan to achieve the strategic goal

2.1 Ensuring the resilience of the economic life of the Nation

193. The Nation's vital networks must function at all times, even if necessary in degraded mode and prioritised for essential uses. This includes guaranteeing the uninterrupted availability of civilian telecommunications networks for emergency numbers, government networks, whether classified or not, and energy and drinking water distribution networks. The cyber resilience of critical entities, including healthcare facilities, hospitals, banks, telecommunications operators, the energy sector, food supply, water and sanitation networks, and transport, must also be ensured.

194. The next step is to secure critical supplies. This means identifying vulnerabilities in value chains, determining which vital goods should benefit from special measures, and knowing which key companies can be mobilised quickly. Diversification of critical supply sources must be systematised in anticipation of possible failures.

195. Upgrading the physical and digital protection of operators of vital importance (OIV), their critical infrastructures and, more broadly, entities described as essential and important[29] is a major objective to be achieved.

196. Efforts will also be pursued within the EU and NATO to strengthen the tools and strategy currently being developed, in conjunction with national competences. France will contribute at European level to the development of the EU's crisis management strategy.

2.2 Ensuring the moral rearmament of the Nation by making citizens players in cohesion and resilience in the event of a major crisis

197. All citizens must be able to play an active role in national cohesion and resilience, to protect themselves, their loved ones and, in doing so, contribute to the country's overall preparedness. Engagement, in all its forms, whether within the armed forces or through civil mobilisation schemes, must be embedded in each individual's civic journey and valued on a daily basis.

198. This will notably involve the evolution of the Defence and Citizenship Day.

199. This will then involve adapting initiatives aimed at young people, such as the "committed classes" and "committed high schools" programmes, Air Youth Squadrons, Civil Security Cadets, civic service schemes and others, in order to structure lifelong pathways for engagement and foster a culture of resilience from an early age.

200. The goal is to familiarise nearly 10 million young people aged 13 to 25 with national defence and security issues, particularly hybrid threats and information manipulation. This will require the training and mobilisation of those who act as intermediaries for young people, including education and higher education staff, as well as those involved in sports and community organisations.

201. It is becoming necessary for the Nation as a whole to turn its attention back to its defence and security. This involves strengthening national cohesion and creating a pool of people who can be mobilised in the event of a crisis. In this context, a revamped voluntary military service could be created to offer adult French citizens basic military training, which could lead to further engagement.

202. The various reserve and volunteer schemes will also be made operational and harmonised as part of an expanded and modernised National Guard, incorporating all existing schemes within a clarified and structured framework for engagement opportunities. The purpose of these arrangements is to:

- guarantee an increase in reserves to support active units on military missions, in France or abroad;

[29] These entities are defined in articles 8 and 9 of the "resilience" bill.

- support internal security forces on national territory;
- provide local logistical and operational support to crisis management players;
- strengthen the DTIB's production and operational maintenance chains, as well as state-owned manufacturers through the defence industrial reserve;
- ensure the continuity of vitally important activities (current national security service), the functioning of local authorities and the economy in support of a major commitment.

203. In the overseas territories, the Adapted Military Service (SMA), a socio-professional integration scheme for young people from the overseas regions, already contributes to moral rearmament. It also provides an additional operational resource for crisis response.

204. In the event of a major crisis, the large-scale call-up of volunteers will be controlled, directed and coordinated with the services of the State, local authorities and local associations, as part of a renewed and expanded national guard.

205. In addition, we must strengthen France's strategic thinking to deal with the renewed threat on the European continent, the accelerated transformation of our security environment, the increased likelihood of strategic surprises and the centrality of disinformation issues. It requires considerable investment in the strategic sector of our universities, *grandes écoles* and research institutions, to support and promote the ecosystem of education, research and debate on defence and national security issues.

206. The ministries will continue their efforts to raise awareness and provide training on strategic international issues to the worlds of politics, business and associations, academia, young people and the general public, in particular through the activities of the diplomatic and consular academy of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs and its various vectors.

2.3 Anticipating and combating threats to the integrity of all territories

207. Whether linked to a major deployment of our armed forces abroad or not, an increase in hybrid actions, including sabotage, economic warfare, interference, cyberattacks and information manipulation, targeting all territories of the Republic must be anticipated. The relationship between the build-up of French forces in a crisis and the need to strengthen territorial protection must be rethought in this scenario, and civil-military coordination must be updated.

208. Within this framework, the Interministerial Committee for National Resilience (CIRN) and the Interministerial Commission on National Defence (CIDN) must continue to expand their role, particularly by establishing a more operational connection between military defence, internal security and civil defence measures. This work should enable France to fully assume its role as Host Nation[30], thanks to an appropriate network of service providers, suppliers and industrialists throughout the national territory. The transport networks (rail, sea and air, etc.) must be given particular attention. Interministerial national defence and security alert stages, designed to be genuinely civil-military in nature, must be defined to allow for adjusting alert levels on national territory, alongside a VIGIPIRATE system specifically adapted to the terrorist threat.

209. Territorial operational defence will be overhauled to improve collective action in the event of a crisis in France or overseas. The work begun in 2022 must be speeded up, to strengthen civil-military dialogue, coordination and the distribution of defence and security missions, improve the interoperability of forces and resources, and be able to deal with the possible consequences on French territory (damage to critical entities) of a major engagement outside the country.

210. Particular attention will be paid to the overseas territories because of their strategic dimension, for their own security and that of mainland France. Adaptations are needed to deal not only with

[30] Defined as the capacity to provide civil and military aid in peacetime, in times of crisis or in the event of conflict by a host country to allied forces and organisations located or in transit on its territory.

natural disasters, but also with organised crime, hybrid threats and ever-increasing foreign demands. These adaptations involve the pre-positioning of resilience, defence and security resources and capabilities, the development of procedures for regular exchanges of information on separatist movements, interference detected at central level with the territories concerned and follow-up action. A rapid reaction capability on the part of the armed forces, as one of the State's means of action, is essential, in particular to prevent any attempt at a fait accompli targeting some of these territories. Particular attention will be paid to strengthening local players in the fight against the manipulation of information.

2.4 Protecting the Nation against risks and threats

211. The resilience of the Nation will depend on strengthening a comprehensive defence approach, in addition to the complete overhaul of national defence and security planning, which will be brought to completion.

212. Local authorities, positioned on the front line in the face of risks, are key players in the Nation's resilience, due to their proximity to citizens, their expertise and their human and material resources. They must achieve a high level of preparedness, with the support and assistance of the State.

213. While the jihadist-inspired terrorist threat is likely to remain at a high level in the coming years, it is necessary to maintain the resources devoted to the fight against terrorism and to continue to develop the legal framework so as to be able to hinder the new forms of the threat[31].

214. In addition, internal protest movements, catalysed by foreign interference, are adopting increasingly violent modus operandi, thanks in particular to militants seasoned in conflict zones. The State must have sufficient knowledge of these phenomena to be able to detect and prevent any switch to a terrorist modus operandi.

215. It is also essential to improve monitoring and understanding of violent extremist groups that reject republican and democratic modes of expression. The fight against these entities, which are potentially influenced by foreign actors, requires a global effort to ensure a graduated response, including judicial, administrative and financial obstruction.

216. The threat of anti-republican and subversive Islamism must also be given special attention. In addition to better documentation and understanding of the causes of this threat and raising the awareness of all those involved in institutions and associations, we need to use the full range of administrative and legal tools available to deal with it.

217. Faced with the challenges posed by illegal immigration, France, in coordination with the European Union and its other partners, must be in a position to stem the flow of illegal immigrants, exploited by criminal networks or certain States, and to guarantee the sustainability of the asylum system, designed to provide a dignified reception for asylum seekers.

218. The fight against organised crime and drug trafficking is also a national priority. All necessary resources must be devoted to this effort.

219. The State will prepare the Nation for a France that is 4 degrees warmer by the end of the century. The consequences for land use planning, agricultural yields, biodiversity, and the sharp increase in the frequency of natural disasters will be anticipated and will inform all areas of public policy. In addition to the measures to be maintained and developed in terms of environmental protection and the fight against global warming, every public policy will have to systematically include a time

[31] These threats are characterised by increasingly young people, often unconnected with traditional movements and radicalised very quickly on the Internet, as well as by individuals suffering from psychological or psychiatric disorders that cannot be assessed by the intelligence services alone.

horizon of +30/+50 years, in order to ensure the sustainability and therefore the long-term usefulness of the efforts made.

220. The State will be in a position to deal with any major health crisis, particularly the risk of a pandemic. To this end, it will strengthen its self-sufficiency in the supply of healthcare products.

221. Responding to the threat of a nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical (NRBC) event on national territory will remain a priority for the State. It is based on shared knowledge, interoperability of resources and procedures, and territorial networking.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3

An economy prepared for war

222. By 2030, the French economy and industrial capabilities will meet the needs of the armed forces and internal security forces to cope with a major war outside France and its consequences on national territory. The industrial base is resilient and the supply of resources and energy is sufficiently diversified and robust. The State has acquired skills and technical resources that enable it to develop certain capabilities internally. Innovation driven by mid-sized companies, SMEs and start-ups is fully integrated into the capabilities approach. Technological mastery and production capacity enable France's partners to be supported over the long term, including those in a war situation. In a context of "economic fog of war", France's budgetary sustainability and financial sovereignty have been strengthened, in particular through a reduction in public debt.

1. Assessment of measures implemented since the 2022 National Strategic Review

223. Since 2022, France has created the conditions to support innovation, facilitate rapid acquisitions and increase the production rates of defence and security equipment, including radars, Aster and Mistral missiles, Caesar artillery systems and Rafale aircraft. In addition to efforts to simplify armament programme management, this has resulted in addressing production bottlenecks, securing certain stockpiles of raw materials, components, semi-finished products and spare parts, as well as preparing for the requisitioning of personnel and equipment and prioritising production, as provided for under the 2024–2030 Military Programming Law.

224. The State's support for defence manufacturers has been confirmed through a proactive investment policy, new measures to strengthen their security, tools (OSINT[32] campus) designed to anticipate market developments and competitive manoeuvres, local and regional support measures, as well as actions with the EU and NATO. The financial effort and the prospects for global orders provided for in the Military Programming Law (LPM) have given greater visibility to future armament programmes (systems, munitions and support). Some manufacturers have adapted their production cycles and planned long-term investment in production tools.

225. Efforts to reduce certain dependencies have led to the relocation of around ten sensitive production lines to national territory, including the manufacture of large-calibre propellant explosives by Eurenco in Bergerac and the special steel welding sector by Selectarc in Belfort.

226. The Ministry of the Armed Forces has also introduced support measures for defence manufacturers at local level (industrial performance diagnostics), regional level (agreements and regional defence industry representatives, known as AIDER) and national level (Defence Accelerators in partnership with Bpifrance).

227. In terms of skills, the Ministry for National Education, Higher Education and Research, together with the Ministry of the Armed Forces and local stakeholders, has implemented schemes to develop pools of qualified personnel and address critical skills shortages for both the defence

[32] Open Source Intelligence.

industry and research sectors. This includes funding for doctoral theses and research projects, partnerships, and support for engineering schools and research institutions.

228. The creation of the Defence Industrial Reserve has made it possible to recruit the first reservists with targeted skills capable of bolstering DITB manufacturers or the French Defence Procurement Agency (DGA) in the event of a crisis.

229. The State has organised itself to better detect and support innovation, in particular through financial tools to support innovative companies that contribute to France's strategic autonomy: Definvest, defence innovation fund, French Tech Souveraineté.

230. Finally, France has diversified its financing tools for defence companies, notably by building a network of economic players capable of investing in the Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DITB) and supporting fundraising projects for companies in the sector. Actions have also been taken with European bodies, including the European Securities and Markets Authority and the European Investment Bank, to remove the barriers preventing DITB companies from accessing private or public funding at the European level (defence exclusion).

2. Action plan to achieve the strategic goal

2.1 Strengthening industry's ability to meet defence and security needs

231. The industrial sector, including the Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DITB), must be capable of delivering rapid, agile and large-scale production while maintaining the ability to ensure the long-term manufacture of complex systems. To achieve this, the reduction of production vulnerabilities (bottlenecks, supply, security and energy availability) must be pursued. The resilience of subcontracting chains must be guaranteed, including through the use of European companies where possible. The search for measures to reduce costs, lead times and production rates must be pursued in conjunction with industrial players, by considering, where necessary, the use of production methods from the civilian sector.

232. At the same time, the Ministry of the Armed Forces must identify acceptable performance reductions to reduce costs and production times. The application of standards and regulations must be modulated according to the context.

233. Efforts in developing national skills and industrial capabilities must be adjusted according to the level of sovereignty expected for weapons systems (independence, partial dependence or reliance on foreign markets). National capabilities for design, production and operational maintenance (MCO) must be scaled accordingly.

234. At the same time, the Ministry of the Interior must support the structuring of the Security Industrial and Technological Base (SITB).

235. Long-term support for the armed forces and internal security forces will be based on an appropriate network of service providers, suppliers and manufacturers throughout France to meet all non-armament requirements.

236. In line with this strategy of industrial sovereignty, whenever possible, the best European manufacturers in the sector should be used, with a view to performance, efficiency and cost reduction. European preference, and in particular its financial benefits, must therefore benefit all EU Member States, contribute to structuring its ecosystem and, more broadly, support Europe’s dual-use industries.

2.2 Improving the economic, cyber and physical security of DITB companies and the security industry sector

237. The economic, physical and cyber security of companies within the Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DITB) and the security industry sector must be guaranteed to protect intellectual property and production capabilities.

238. The interministerial economic security mechanism, updated since 2019, will be particularly mobilised to detect and address threats targeting companies contributing to the national defence effort. DITB companies, as well as SMEs, mid-sized companies and promising start-ups with innovative expertise, may be more systematically encouraged to invoke the so-called "blocking law" of 26 July 1968 to counter requests for information or even intrusive audits. Particular attention will be paid to economic health and the regulation of foreign investment in DTIB companies.

239. In terms of cyber security and physical protection, defence companies will be bound by contractual clauses to ensure their maturity in these areas. At the same time, mid-sized companies, SMEs and start-ups will be supported in adapting their structures through diagnostic and remediation systems provided by the DGA.

240. Finally, France must make the most of short and long-term European funding (ASAP, EDIRPA, EDIP33, FEDEF34, etc.) and encourage the emergence of new levers that fully integrate European preference and strategic autonomy.

2.3 Instilling a "different way of doing things"

241. Procurement procedures must continue to evolve to meet the requirements of agility, rapid acquisition and "urgent innovation" for the armed forces. They must, among other things, allow "off-the-shelf" purchases or facilitate scaling up, with priority given to European sources. Particular emphasis will be placed on innovative, low-cost capabilities with short production cycles, so that they can be rapidly integrated or deployed in support of more conventional weapons systems (low-cost UAVs, for example).

242. The Ministry of the Armed Forces must also work to simplify administrative procedures in order to speed up the commissioning of equipment. This work should focus on the expression of requirements (identification of acceptable performance reductions to reduce costs and production times), the definition of applicable standards (airworthiness of aircraft, safety of munitions, military mobility, etc.) and the adaptation of production verification operations for military equipment.

243. Capturing innovation also means that the State must strengthen its ability to identify and evaluate companies proposing disruptive solutions, along the lines of what has been achieved under the defence aerial drone pact. Particular attention will be paid to French and European SMEs, mid-sized companies and start-ups, also outside defence. Monitoring of the SITB by the Ministry of the Interior, which is still at an embryonic stage, will have to be fully coordinated with that of the DITB by the Ministry of the Armed Forces.

244. Finally, mastery of certain critical skills is imperative (digital, artificial intelligence, cyber defence, intelligence, electromagnetic warfare, deterrence, quantum technology, UAVs) to be able to choose between "doing" and "having things done" and if necessary respond to specific use cases. Efforts should be made to take advantage of government skills and capabilities to develop the relevant technological building blocks, taking into account cost, criticality, speed and confidentiality constraints.

2.4 Improving the financing of defence and security companies and preparing for "war economy" conditions

245. Public and private investors, both institutional (Bpifrance, Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, European Investment Bank – EIB) and individual, will be mobilised to support the financing of

[33] European Defence Industry Programme.

[34] European Defence Fund (EDF).

defence companies, in particular to promote and encourage the emergence of high-performing SMEs, mid-sized companies and start-ups within the DITB and SITB.

246. In particular, the State must ensure that the internal policies of banks and insurance companies do not go beyond regulatory exclusions. Similarly, France must take action to create favourable conditions (strategic visibility, acculturation, facilitation of a sector-wide dialogue) for investment in the DTIB, in particular by ensuring that ESG rules (environmental, social and governance criteria) do not dissuade investors from financing DTIB companies.

247. Finally, the Ministry of the Armed Forces will use innovative financing to encourage the emergence of disruptive technologies.

First class cyber resilience

248. France's ambition remains to achieve cyber resilience[35] that establishes the country as a permanent member of the leading group of global cyber powers.

1. Assessment of measures implemented since the 2022 National Strategic Review

249. France's cyber security governance has been organised around three missions. The State defends the Nation, secures itself and protects the Nation. Within this updated framework, the Cyber Crisis Coordination Centre (C4) leads, at the technical level, efforts to improve knowledge, detection, characterisation and attribution of attacks through operational coordination between the National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI), Cyber Defence Command (COMCYBER), Directorate General of Armaments (DGA), Directorate General for Internal Security (DGSI) and Directorate General for External Security (DGSE). In its strategic format, which includes the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, it provides political authorities with comprehensive response strategies.

250. France has also adopted a new national cybersecurity strategy, validated in November 2024, which will be published in 2025.

251. The major developments, implemented to coincide with the Paris 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games, have successfully tested the validity of the French cyber defence model. This collective success brought together private cyber defence stakeholders around ANSSI, with support from the Ministry of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of the Interior to mitigate the risk of exceeding available capacities.

252. To respond to a threat that has become systemic, France has also strengthened the management of its digital security. The first step has been to overhaul the governance of State IT system security.

253. In addition, the deployment of incident response centres (CSIRT[36]) within ministries, in economic sectors and in the regions has taken concrete form and is continuing: InterCERT France, which brings together most of the French CSIRTs, has been strengthened during this period; a new support system for the general public, "17Cyber", has been deployed for victims of cyber-attacks.

254. Finally, the reinforcement of the national cyber defence system was completed along three lines:

- investment to raise the level of cyber security for particularly vulnerable players (local authorities, public establishments and SMEs) or critical sectors (hospitals, energy);
- public cybersecurity policy initiatives with decentralised government bodies, including local authorities;

[35] Resilience is defined as the willingness and ability of a country, society and government to withstand the consequences of a major attack or disaster, and then rapidly restore their ability to function normally, or at least in a socially acceptable manner. It concerns not only public authorities, but also economic actors and civil society as a whole.

[36] Computer Security Incident Response Team.

- the deployment of private cybersecurity services and products, through its certification and qualification policy and France 2030 investments.

255. This has also resulted in the operational deployment of the Cyber Crisis Coordination Centre and the attribution of cyberattacks to Russia, including the collective EU attribution of the attacks on VIA-SAT in 2022 and the German SPD in 2024, as well as France's first public national attribution in 2025 of several cyberattacks targeting French interests, carried out using the APT28 modus operandi linked to the Russian military intelligence service (GRU) in 2025.

256. France has also adopted an investment policy to accelerate training, research and innovation in cybersecurity. It is based in particular on a research programme co-steered by the French National Institute for Research in Computer Science and Control (INRIA), the French Atomic Energy and Alternative Energies Commission (CEA) and the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS), and a transfer programme at the Cyber Campus operated by INRIA.

257. An initial ministerial strategy to combat cybercrime has been implemented by the Ministry of the Interior to strengthen the action of the internal security forces. The Ministry of Justice has strengthened its resources for combating and handling cybercrime cases.

258. With the 2024-2030 military programming law, France has also acquired new advanced cyber defence operational capabilities.

259. Efforts have also focused on mastering critical technologies. France has continued to invest in the 2024-2030 Military Programming Law (LPM), in order to maintain sovereign control over critical cybersecurity technologies. This has led to investment in products designed to protect the State's most sensitive information.

260. It has also meant continuing work on securing the most structuring digital technologies. The inauguration in early 2025 of the National Institute for the Security and Evaluation of Artificial Intelligence[37] (INESIA) is a case in point.

261. Action has been taken to ensure that France remains a driving force in European and international cybersecurity. Since 2022, France has supported the adoption of the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA[38]) and the directive on the security of networks and information systems (NIS 2). It also contributes to the protection of European institutions. In addition, France supports the implementation of solidarity mechanisms, such as the cyber reserve made up of private service providers. France has also contributed to the design of the first European certification scheme, which will provide greater trust and transparency regarding the security level of products within the single market. France is also fully committed to European and international cooperation networks (CSIRT Network, CyCLONe[39], IWWN[40]).

262. France's cyber resilience also depends on that of its partners and the security and stability of cyberspace as a whole. With this in mind, France has supported the development of capabilities in the Balkans (Western Balkans cyber capabilities centre inaugurated in December 2024), in Africa (national school with a regional vocation in Dakar) and in Ukraine (in particular within the framework of the Tallinn Mechanism).

263. As a responsible power, France has continued its efforts since 2020 to overhaul the UN's cyber architecture in order to make the negotiating framework more durable and produce more concrete results. It is also behind the international initiative of the "Pall Mall" process, which aims

[37] Jointly coordinated by the SGDSN and the DGE, it brings together INRIA, ANSSI, the National Laboratory for Metrology and Testing (LNE) and the Centre of Expertise for Digital Regulation (PEReN).

[38] As part of the EU's 2020 cybersecurity strategy, the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) aims to strengthen the cybersecurity of digital products placed on the European market by imposing strict requirements on all suppliers of digital products and services.

[39] The CyCLONe cooperation network brings together the authorities of the 27 Member States responsible for crisis management and/or cyberspace policy.

[40] International Watch and Warning Network.

to combat the proliferation and irresponsible use of cyber-intrusive capabilities available on the market.

264. The French government has also supported the development of national awareness and skills in the face of cyber risk. As part of this, an observatory of cybersecurity professions has been set up and a programme bringing together stakeholders has been launched around the cyber campus. Initiatives to raise awareness of cyber issues among secondary school pupils have also been implemented.

265. Finally, several national and international exercises have been carried out to disseminate a crisis management culture to a wide range of players (REMPAR22 and JOP23 exercises).

2. Action plan to achieve the strategic goal

266. Based on the national cybersecurity strategy approved by the National Defence and Security Council on 27 November 2024, the new measures proposed aim to accelerate its implementation in order to achieve one of the highest levels of cyber resilience by 2030.

2.1 Making France the largest pool of cyber talent in Europe

267. In response to the shortage of skilled workers in the cybersecurity sector, France must invest heavily to steer individuals towards these professions and support training and reskilling programmes, which are essential to achieving its ambition for cyber resilience.

2.2 Strengthening the nation's cyber resilience

268. France must implement an ambitious plan to raise the general level of cyber security, including that of the State's IT base, and train the Nation to react to cyber crises.

269. This plan will be based on the continuation of targeted cybersecurity support programmes. In line with the programmes already underway, the implementation of the NIS 2 directive must be accompanied by seed funding for the sectors[41] and players that are the most vulnerable and the most critical to the functioning of the Nation. The CSIRTs must be made permanent and strengthened.

270. It is also essential to implement a cyber security prevention programme.

2.3 Hindering the spread of the cyber threat

271. France will strengthen its ability to anticipate cyber threats and hinder them in order to significantly increase the cost to attackers.

272. To guarantee its ability to detect, prevent and disrupt cyberattacks, the sharing of technical threat information will be increased. This will involve, in particular, operators of vital importance (OIVs), cybersecurity service providers and telecommunications operators, building on CSIRT networks.

273. The development of human, technical and legal capabilities to combat cybercrime will continue. These efforts will be carried out within a framework of reinforced national coordination and international cooperation.

274. France will be able to increase the use of its offensive cyber intelligence and disruption capabilities in strict compliance with international law.

275. Finally, the national cyber posture will be strengthened to take into account the possibility of a major confrontation in Europe.

[41] 18 strategic sectors have been identified in the NIS 2 directive.

2.4 Maintaining control over the security of our digital foundations

276. To ensure its cyber resilience, France must master critical technologies and product and service evaluation capabilities. To this end, it will support the consolidation of world-class industrial players at European level. It must also identify its major technological dependencies and vulnerabilities, both for the State and for the economy, and develop a realistic and progressive remediation plan to sustainably control its sovereignty and digital resilience.

277. France will continue its investments to develop new ranges of digital security products, particularly encryption equipment, to meet the sovereign needs of the State and the European Union.

278. It will also support the development of a range of cybersecurity products accessible to the widest possible audience.

279. In parallel with the NIS 2 directive, the implementation of the CRA should make it possible to extend the requirement for digital hygiene to all digital products.

280. France will expand the work of INESIA to strengthen its capabilities in support of AI cybersecurity.

281. Finally, France will also implement a plan for the transition to post-quantum cryptography, which it will also support at European level.

2.5 Supporting the security and stability of cyberspace in Europe and internationally

282. France will reaffirm its status as a responsible, cooperative and supportive cyber power by strengthening its cooperation and influence capabilities.

283. It acts in cyberspace based on its own strategic cyber framework and in full respect of international law. France will anchor its actions as broadly as possible within a multilateral framework and will continue promoting its initiative to reform UN governance on cybersecurity, with the aim of operationalising the commitments made under the responsible behaviour norms agreed in 2025. It will also continue its efforts within the framework of the Pall Mall Process. In the digital field in particular, France will continue international discussions on the AI-cyber nexus, drawing on the recommendations of the Defence Ethics Committee.

284. It is also necessary to act as a reliable ally and partner in cyberspace, in the service of the EU's strategic autonomy and within NATO. In all its partnerships, France will promote a pragmatic approach in order to increase the global level of security. It will mobilise its resources to provide structural and operational assistance to partners who express a need for it, on the model of the national school with a regional vocation (ENVR) "cyber capabilities"' in the Western Balkans, but also on a bilateral basis.

285. Finally, France will support the development of European defence and NATO's cyber capability.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 5

France as a reliable ally in the Euro-Atlantic area

286. In 2030, France will play an essential role in the defence of Europe, in particular against Russia in the context of a strengthened and rebalanced European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance thanks to the strategic awakening of Europeans and the new instruments at their disposal in the field of defence.

1. Assessment of measures implemented since the 2022 National Strategic Review

287. Since 2022, France has sought to strengthen NATO's European pillar[42] with its European partners to address the threats posed by Russia.

288. At the same time, France and the United States have maintained a very high level of cooperation, particularly on international crises. The State visit in June 2024, preceded by the commemorations of the 80th anniversary of D-Day, gave rise to two joint declarations, one on support for Ukraine and the other on strengthening bilateral cooperation.

289. France, one of the driving forces behind cooperation between NATO and the European Union, continued to advocate renewed dialogue at technical and political levels between the two organisations, and greater synergy and complementarity within the European security and defence architecture.

290. France's increased contribution to the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture has strengthened its position as a reliable ally committed to the security of its European partners most exposed to the Russian threat. This contribution has been made on land (in Romania and Estonia), at sea (from the Baltic to the Mediterranean) and in the air (air policing in the Baltic States).

291. Efforts to promote the specific role of France's nuclear deterrent, independent of that of the Alliance, have also continued. France has stepped up its efforts to educate the public about its contribution to NATO's global deterrent, and has sought to make its positions on a credible balance between nuclear, conventional and missile defence better understood in the Alliance's posture.

292. At the same time, France has demonstrated its solidarity and reliability through its commitment on the Alliance's southern flank by taking command of NATO's mission in Iraq for the first time.

293. The increase in defence budgets provided for in the 2024-2030 military programming law has made it possible to achieve the objective of raising the national defence effort to 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2024 and subsequent years. This significant effort has demonstrated France's investment in the Alliance and its respect for its commitments.

[42] The European pillar of NATO refers to the set of common (or jointly defined) capabilities and approaches that enable European NATO Member States to fulfil their obligations as allies while also acting together independently for their own defence.

294. In line with one of NATO's major areas of work, support has been given to strengthening interoperability and overhauling defence equipment standardisation procedures, while taking care to maintain the central role of the Member States in the decision-making process.

295. In the area of human resources, a proactive policy has been pursued to improve the French rate of staffing positions, particularly within the NATO Command Structure, but also within the secretariat and the international staff, so as to play a full part in Alliance decision-making.

2. Action plan to achieve the strategic goal

2.1 Maintaining the transatlantic relationship with high standards and realism

296. France will continue to promote a balanced sharing of the burden for Europe's security, based on genuine European strategic autonomy and a strong European defence industrial base.

297. France will pursue dialogue with the United States around shared interests, defending established frameworks for action and the European contribution to the continent's security, in line with the agenda promoted since 2017 to strengthen European strategic autonomy and defence.

2.2 Driving the strengthening of NATO's European pillar

298. France, a founding member of NATO, will be a driving force behind a strong and credible European pillar of the Alliance. Strengthening this pillar, with the support of European institutions and European states, is essential to compensate for the potential effects of reduced American engagement while safeguarding the continent's security. Together with other Europeans, particularly Germany, the United Kingdom, Poland, Italy, the Baltic States and the Nordic countries (Finland, Norway and Sweden), France will continue to give substance to this pillar by demonstrating Europeans' ability to act for the defence of the Euro-Atlantic area, in support of peace on the continent, including autonomously if necessary. Strengthening France's commitment within the Alliance, and more broadly among the nations of Europe, is an essential condition for this. Greater European responsibility for the continent's security must be underpinned by an ambitious roadmap to ensure the resilience of both the Alliance and the European Union in the face of Russia, with more limited support from Washington.

299. In this regard, Europeans must acquire critical capabilities (missile defence, deep strike capabilities, suppression of enemy air defences, strategic enablers[43], early warning systems and command and control) to be able to conduct high-intensity operations independently in Europe and within NATO.

300. The European pillar will also take shape through stronger alignment between European efforts and the capability needs identified within NATO. The goal is to achieve a shared understanding and improve the efficiency of investments. Strengthening this pillar will also require better integration of operational and support capabilities for the defence of European territory. Lastly, the efforts undertaken by the Member States and the EU (dedicated funding in support of Ukraine, defence, EDIP, Common Security and Defence Policy – CSDP – operations and missions, White Paper on the future of European defence, flagship CDP[44] projects) and in ad hoc formats (ELSA) should be recognised and encouraged. They contribute to the sustainable strengthening of the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture. In terms of the defence industry and the acquisition of capabilities, the strengthening of the European pillar will involve raising awareness among European partners of the obstacles posed by the various extraterritorial regulations and by an appropriate dialogue with the external countries concerned.

301. France will also contribute to preserving the cohesion of the Alliance. To this end, positive efforts to mobilise European nations around common interests must be supported. The arrival of new

[43] Particularly in the fields of space, air-to-air refuelling and strategic and tactical air transport.

[44] Capability development priorities.

members (Sweden, Finland) bringing their own strategic thinking represents an opportunity. The momentum generated by the coalition of the willing on support for Ukraine and, more broadly, on Europe's strategic interests, must be maintained over the long term.

302. In the operational domain, France will continue its efforts to ensure the credibility of allied contributions to NATO's defence plans. Alongside its European partners, it will also support efforts to increase the Alliance's responsiveness through its contribution to the NATO Force Model and to components of the Allied Reaction Force (ARF) early warning system, for which France will assume command of the land and air components in 2026 and the naval component in 2027. It will encourage an increase in realistic, multi-domain and multi-environment exercises.

303. Finally, the renewed dialogue between NATO and the EU must be conducted with full respect for the respective mandates of these organisations and in complete transparency towards the Nations, particularly regarding information-sharing.

2.3 Seizing the opportunities presented by a controlled expansion of the Alliance's capability needs

304. The significant increase in capability requirements must be addressed. The credibility of France's response to the demands of collective defence within the Alliance, in a rapidly deteriorating strategic environment, will require a coherent adjustment to the level of national defence spending. At the same time, it will ensure that joint funding and investment in capabilities are managed in such a way as to guarantee the operational effectiveness of spending. France will seize opportunities for ad hoc capability solutions.

305. In terms of innovation, it is necessary to support the actions and initiatives of the Supreme Allied Command for Transformation. The inclusion of innovative technologies in NATO exercises and operations, and their use to help nations meet capability targets and generate mass at a sustainable cost, represent positive orientations.

2.4 Anchoring NATO's partnership strategy within the framework of its agreed missions

306. The relationship with Ukraine must remain central to NATO's partnership strategy in application of its mandate to defend the Euro-Atlantic area. It is necessary to preserve and build on the dialogue with Ukraine and NATO's handling of the Russian threat.

307. NATO's partnerships must be supported in line with agreed missions.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 6

France as a driving force behind European strategic autonomy

308. By 2030, France will have contributed to a genuine step change in strengthening European defence capabilities in the technological, operational and resilience domains, particularly in the energy sector, to ensure Europe can defend its interests and societal model autonomously if necessary. This shift will enable a tangible contribution to strengthening France's own defence capabilities and the security of the continent.

1. Assessment of measures implemented since the 2022 National Strategic Review

309. Three years after the start of Russia's illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, France is one of Kyiv's leading supporters in both the military and civilian spheres. This support was formalised by the bilateral cooperation and security agreement signed on 16 February 2024 between France and Ukraine and France's support for Kyiv's EU membership prospects. At the same time, to ensure that the EU is capable of providing Ukraine with long-term support, France has worked to strengthen European sovereignty and defence, drawing in particular on its triple membership of the EU, NATO and the UNSC. The promotion of the strategic autonomy agenda and the deepening of its security and defence partnerships, as well as the development of capability and industrial cooperation (in particular with Germany, the United Kingdom and Poland) have all contributed to this.

310. Awareness of the need for Europeans to take greater responsibility for their own security has grown. Europeans have developed a shared understanding of the security challenges facing the continent, and this has fed into the thinking of the institutions. Efforts in this direction have resulted in increased political mobilisation and the adoption of various mechanisms to promote a Europe that is more capable of acting alone to ensure its security.

311. As part of an emergency response, new European instruments have been added to existing ones, including the ASAP emergency regulations to support Ukraine by strengthening industrial production capacities for munitions and missiles, and EDIRPA to support joint procurement by Member States. Following on from the defence industrial strategy (EDIS[45]), the EDIP regulation and the SAFE[46] regulation will provide a long-term framework for this defence industry support policy. The adoption of these instruments and the unprecedented mobilisation of the EU budget for the continent's defence represent a major and decisive step forward in Europeans' assumption of their strategic responsibilities for the continent's defence and security.

312. The EU has played a key role in military support for Ukraine through the European Peace Facility (EPF), the ERA loan[47] reimbursed using interest from frozen Russian assets, and the EU Military

[45] European Defence Industrial Strategy.

[46] Security Action for Europe.

[47] Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration.

Assistance Mission (EUMAM) for training the Ukrainian armed forces. For the first time, the EPF has been massively mobilised to provide military equipment to Ukraine, including lethal equipment.

313. The EPF has also made it possible to support other partners in the EU's neighbourhood, in Africa and the Middle East.

314. With regard to CSDP missions and operations, France has worked, in coordination with its partners, to increase their responsiveness and flexibility, contributing to making the EU a global security provider. This includes the creation of the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM), the EU Mission in Armenia (EUM), the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM), EUSDI in the Gulf of Guinea, and the ASPIDES maritime operation in response to higher-intensity threats.

315. Against the backdrop of Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine, France increased its investment in the Western Balkans and supported progress in these countries' EU accession processes. Political and military dialogue has intensified, including with the three NATO allies in the region. France has stepped up its commitment to operations and national intelligence capabilities, notably by reinvesting in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and assuming strategic command of the EUFOR Althea mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

316. In addition, since 2022, France has supported a number of initiatives aimed at strengthening European resilience and developing tools to deal with competitors' hybrid strategies.

2. Action plan to achieve the strategic goal

2.1 Unite around a greater assumption of responsibility by Europeans for the security of the continent and contribute to a united and credible Europe

317. Faced with the challenges on the European continent and elsewhere, France is assuming its full share of responsibility and is seeking to promote the unity and solidarity of Europeans regardless of the scenarios for the development of US policy towards Europe. It is doing this both by making major investments in defence capabilities and technologies that are key to European sovereignty and by promoting balanced and ambitious cooperation with its main partners, based on the principle of mutually agreed dependence. Bilateral partnerships must, in this respect, serve the objective of strategic autonomy, the strengthening of European defence in the long term, and help to embody and strengthen the European pillar of NATO.

318. It is necessary to continue to work with our partners towards a convergence of views among Europeans on the assessment of situations and the strategic implications for Europe, given that they have different strategic cultures or political priorities.

319. Within the European Union, the Franco-German link plays an essential role. The partnership with the United Kingdom is increasingly strategic.

320. Work on deepening the Franco-German defence partnership will continue in the spirit of the Aachen Treaty. Defining an ambitious common vision of European defence for the long term is a priority. France and Germany will jointly contribute to strengthening Europe's integration, capacity for action and defence capability.

321. The modernisation of the bilateral partnership with the United Kingdom (Lancaster House) must also be finalised. This structuring relationship must be maintained and developed.

322. Italy and Spain are key partners, both in theatres of operation (particularly in the Mediterranean) and in terms of cooperation on capabilities and industry.

323. France will deepen the dynamic partnership with Poland on a bilateral basis (Nancy Treaty) and within the framework of the Weimar format.

324. France will also consolidate several of its other strategic and capability partnerships (Greece, Croatia, Belgium, Portugal), in the service of a shared vision.

325. With the Baltic States and the Nordic countries (in particular Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway), which are particularly concerned by the increased threat posed by Russia, France will endeavour to develop concrete joint initiatives for the benefit of European defence.

326. France must also continue to develop and refine the EU's partnership approach. It will support the strengthening of the EU's defence relations with the countries in its eastern neighbourhood, in the Southern Caucasus and the Balkans, particularly those which are candidates for EU membership, in Africa, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific and, as regards the United States, the implementation of balanced relations supported by sustained and regular dialogue on defence and security. Cooperation between the EU and NATO also remains essential.

327. France will continue its efforts to give substance to NATO's European pillar and will work to establish an ambitious roadmap to guarantee the Alliance's deterrence and defence capability and the European Union's resilience in the face of Russia, whatever Washington's commitment.

328. Support for Ukraine remains a major long-term security issue for Europeans. Speeding up military assistance by supplying equipment and training tailored to Ukrainian needs is crucial. In the longer term, support for Ukraine's DITB must continue and intensify. European unity is essential to achieving these objectives.

329. The stability and security of the Balkans will remain a key concern for the security of the European continent, given the persistent hotspots of tension (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia-Kosovo) and ongoing bilateral disputes.

2.2 Further strengthening European defence capabilities

330. The EU must continue developing an autonomous and sovereign European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) through a decisive step change, by prioritising key capability areas set out in the European Defence White Paper of 19 March 2025. This prioritisation must be accompanied by support for industry and the pooling of demand from Member States to strengthen the competitiveness and resilience of the EDTIB, along with appropriate EU funding. European Union initiatives must embed this support within a long-term approach and promote the production of European defence equipment to reduce industrial dependencies. This approach will also benefit from efforts to reduce external dependencies in the fields of energy and supply chains.

331. In order to finance the change of scale in European defence, France supports new European funding (Readiness 2030 plan, for example). The national system needs to be upgraded to take advantage of these opportunities. France is also working to mobilise public investment (via the European Investment Bank) towards greater openness to the defence sector in its lending policy, as well as private savings.

332. It is essential to establish clear eligibility criteria to strengthen an increasingly sovereign and autonomous European defence industry, free to design, modify and produce without restriction, while embedding a reflex of European preference.

333. France must support the joint development of defence capabilities between Europeans, in line with the operational needs of the armed forces. The emergence of European champions, which must become the preferred solution for procurement, must also be supported. This transformational development is essential for the future, and will require courageous decisions based on the concept of the European champion, which will lead to controlled and accepted forms of mutual dependence in favour of genuine overall European sovereignty. The role of the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) as an acquisition agency for European cooperation could be strengthened in this respect.

334. France will ensure a coherent articulation between European competences and those of the States, which must remain at the heart of the processes (export controls, intelligence, capability development, etc.).

335. In addition, the European Defence Agency (EDA) will be given greater prominence. It plays an important role in identifying areas for cooperation, serving as an intergovernmental forum that enables Europeans to reach common decisions.

2.3 Ensuring European technological superiority in critical areas

336. To support its strategy of technological leadership, France will draw on the European armaments technology roadmap mentioned in the White Paper, and on cooperation with its European partners.

337. It is necessary to further support emerging French and European SMEs, mid-sized companies and start-ups in the defence sector through investment and procurement. This will require involving all relevant stakeholders, including manufacturers, digital service companies, SMEs, mid-sized companies, start-ups and venture capital funds, to agree on procedures adapted to the needs of innovation players. It will also involve encouraging the most promising start-ups to develop military-use applications and motivating the banking sector and European venture capital funds to remove barriers to financing defence innovation. This large-scale strengthening of European support for defence innovation, using agile and dual-use methods, must be a major pillar of our European sovereignty strategy.

2.4 Strengthening European tools to combat hybrid strategies and develop European resilience

338. Through its expertise in resilience, France will contribute to the development of a common European culture on this subject, which must be promoted at European level.

339. It will also support European initiatives that help to raise awareness of national security issues, both within the working culture of EU institutions and in all European legislation, and among citizens and the private sector.

340. At the same time, support must be provided for a high level of European ambition in the fight against hybrid strategies.

2.5 Strengthening Europe's capacity for action

341. France will support initiatives relating to the operationalisation of the solidarity clauses in Articles 42[48] of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

342. The EU must complete the build-up of its rapid deployment capability in order to be able to respond effectively to imminent threats or to react to a crisis situation outside the Union. It will be able to intervene at short notice, including in non-permissive environments, drawing on pre-identified critical forces and capabilities. To this end, France is promoting faster decision-making.

343. France is also actively contributing to the protection of European airspace. In this respect, it supports the EU's efforts to adopt a strategy for the security and defence of European airspace.

344. Finally, the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) contributes to the development of a common strategic culture and enhanced cooperation between Member States. Launched by France in 2018, the format remains relevant to support Europeans taking increasing responsibility for their own security. If revitalised, the EI2 could lead to commitments, discussions and operational exercises.

[48] And in particular its 7th paragraph.

2.6 Guaranteeing European autonomous access and freedom of action in space

345. Europeans must maintain, and if necessary acquire, sovereign capabilities for access to space, essential space-based services (navigation, surveillance, connectivity, observation, data processing) and unrestricted freedom of action in space. In this regard, the development and operation of sovereign European launchers, such as Ariane 6 or VEGA C, is a priority. The Guiana Space Centre (CSG), strategically located, is also a key asset. It remains Europe's main gateway to space.

346. More broadly, space sovereignty requires boosting the competitiveness of European space industry players and ensuring their offering aligns with global market demands. To meet this challenge, we need to mobilise public and private capital, increase risk-taking and innovation capacity, and better detect disruptive technologies. New Space players (start-ups) must play a full part in this process.

347. The implementation of the national space strategy must contribute to achieving these objectives.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 7

France as a reliable sovereignty partner and credible provider of security

348. By 2030, France will consolidate its role as a key partner by deepening and diversifying existing cooperation while preserving its freedom of action.

1. Assessment of measures implemented since the 2022 National Strategic Review

349. In Central and West Africa, since 2023 France has conducted close bilateral dialogue with the host countries of its military bases in order to implement the reconfiguration of the French presence in a concerted manner while preserving its interests on the continent. These bases have been handed back and some (Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon) have been transformed into training centres. The form of security partnerships with Senegal and Chad has recently evolved. The defence cooperation treaty (TCMD) with Djibouti, with which France shares specific strategic interests, has been renewed. France's military presence on the continent is based on cooperation and access, and is now differentiated according to the expectations of its partners.

350. In the Near and Middle East, France has developed and strengthened its defence and security partnerships: support for stability and sovereignty in Iraq, more dynamic partnerships with Jordan and the United Arab Emirates. Our special relations with the Gulf States have been strengthened and offer ambitious prospects for cooperation. These have been marked in particular by high-level exchanges, including the first state visit of the Emir of Qatar in February 2024 and the state visit of the President of the Republic to Saudi Arabia in December 2024. More specifically in the Red Sea, the launch of the European maritime security operation ASPIDES in February 2024 helped to secure trade flows of interest to Europe in response to Houthi attacks in the area. This operation illustrates Europe's autonomy of action in the maritime domain.

351. Since 2022, France has maintained its action in the Mediterranean, notably as part of the EUNAVFOR Irini operation (implementation of the embargo on Libyan arms) or through its partnerships with the other Mediterranean States of the European Union (Spain, Greece, Italy, Cyprus) but also with the States of North Africa (Egypt, Morocco).

352. In addition, since the launch of the Indo-Pacific strategy in 2021, France has been able to promote its unique approach to the region, based on strategic autonomy, while also encouraging the emergence of a European vision. France has consolidated its partnerships and increased its presence in the region, notably through the Clemenceau 2025 mission and regular Pégase[49] missions.

[49] The Clemenceau 2025 mission and the Pégase missions (held annually since 2022) involved the deployment to the Indo-Pacific region of, respectively, the French Navy's carrier strike group and fighter aircraft from the Air and Space Force, along with associated support assets, with a strong focus on partnerships.

2. Action plan to achieve the strategic goal

2.1 Consolidating France's renewed partnership approach in Africa

353. In Africa, France must continue adapting its security offer to make it more targeted and better aligned with the security challenges identified by its partners. France will therefore refocus and deepen its cooperation with countries that wish to engage with a French offer, particularly in the areas of training, equipment supply and support for capability and industrial development.

354. It is essential to further prioritise these efforts through the lens of French interests and the associated threats, notably by updating France's strategy in Africa. This could be done in the run-up to the next Africa-France summit to be held in Nairobi in the first quarter of 2026. At the same time, the implementation of the transformation agenda will be pursued and the civil aspect of partnerships will be developed, particularly around economic, cultural and remembrance issues.

355. In this context, it will take account of African demands (identification of needs, absorption capacity, etc.) and promote European and multilateral security initiatives on the continent, in line with these demands.

2.2 Consolidating France's commitment to regional peace and security in the Near and Middle East

356. France's commitment must be based on its partnerships with the Gulf States (United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain), Egypt and Jordan. We will need to strengthen our partnerships and engage them in crisis resolution and regional stabilisation.

357. France will continue to maintain a demanding partnership with Israel. It will contribute to its security in the same way as that of its other partners in the region. At the same time, France will continue its initiatives in support of the Palestinian people and in the search for a two-state solution.

358. With the United States, the main provider of security in the region, France will maintain dialogue to coordinate actions where necessary.

359. The stabilisation of Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, and the search for a political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are objectives to which we must actively contribute.

360. It will also be necessary to continue the fight against anti-Western narratives disseminated by certain States by raising awareness among partners in the region of converging security interests.

2.3 Making an effective contribution to the security of common spaces and to regional stability in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea

361. France will maintain a presence in the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea and the north-west Indian Ocean as part of its mission to provide maritime security (in particular to protect strategic routes and infrastructures in these two maritime areas). It will deepen cooperation with regional partners in the two areas around mutually beneficial efforts. At the same time, France will maintain close coordination in these regions, aiming to streamline efforts and prioritising the European framework where appropriate.

362. France will also contribute to efforts to preserve the stability of Europe's southern flank in the face of mounting security challenges.

363. Finally, the Mediterranean is crossed by the three main irregular migratory access routes to the EU (western, central and eastern). Faced with these challenges, which also entail risks for national security and cohesion, France will continue its efforts to control these flows within the framework of European and regional cooperation.

2.4 Strengthening the operational implementation of our Indo-Pacific approach

364. France will promote the concrete efforts carried out in line with its Indo-Pacific strategy and will continue contributing to the development of a European approach to the region.

365. Safeguarding free access to shared spaces and preserving strategic stability, despite an increasingly volatile environment, must be pursued in this region, in coordination with partners, particularly regional ones (Japan). France will develop and promote sovereignty partnerships consolidated at the national level (India and, following this model, which responds to the needs expressed by Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia and Singapore) and within the European framework, with states as well as regional organisations, to support the resilience of coastal states, reduce national dependencies (value chains, critical supplies) and combat trafficking. It is also appropriate to deepen cooperation in ad hoc and regional formats.

366. A robust and diversified network of support points in this region remains essential to France's sovereign interests.

2.5 Strengthening the integration and place of the French overseas territories in regional partnerships

367. France will support the regional integration of its overseas territories. It will promote the development of regional initiatives and regional partnerships.

368. Representing 97% of France's maritime areas, home to 80% of France's biodiversity and numerous mining, fishing and agricultural resources, and enabling France to be on the shores of all the world's geostrategic areas, the overseas territories are a major asset. To guarantee its sovereignty and security, France will ensure that the expectations and specific characteristics of its overseas departments and territories in the five oceans (Arctic, Antarctic, Atlantic, Indian and Pacific) are fully and legitimately taken into account.

369. At the same time, it will be necessary to address the issues affecting these territories (anti-French propaganda, illegal trafficking, predation of resources, restricted access). To this end, France will strengthen its permanent sovereign resources in these territories, and its capacity to project additional resources. Similarly, France will ensure the security of air, sea and digital communication lines linking France to the French overseas territories, given their strategic importance. This is particularly the case in the Indo-Pacific region, the epicentre of the global economy, where the overseas territories represent Europe's only presence.

2.6 Promoting ambitious, renewed and effective multilateralism

370. France will maintain its commitment to upholding the Charter of the United Nations and international law to ensure international peace and security. Through its approach within the UN Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly, its actions in crisis areas, and its participation in UN peacekeeping operations, France is concretely engaged in ensuring that dialogue and respect for international law prevail over power struggles.

371. France will continue to promote ambitious and effective multilateralism, with the United Nations system at its heart, to provide lasting solutions to current challenges. The UNSC is the keystone of the collective security framework. France will work to ensure that it functions properly and will continue to promote a comprehensive reform of the Council to improve its effectiveness and representativeness. It will continue its efforts to advocate a framework for the use of the veto in the event of mass atrocities. It will continue its commitment to multilateral crisis resolution instruments, foremost among which are United Nations peace operations.

372. Faced with the challenge posed by the withdrawal of the United States and the crisis in funding for international agencies and organisations, France will continue to support the United Nations transformation and reform agenda in order to prioritise mandates and identify efficiency gains and

new sources of funding. On the humanitarian front, France will continue its political and financial commitment with its partners to meet needs in areas of strategic importance to French interests, with the support of effective humanitarian actors (International Committee of the Red Cross – ICRC, High Commissioner for Refugees – UNHCR, World Food Programme – WFP). In the area of development, France will maintain its ambitious international solidarity action in support of its strategic partnerships and its objective of diversifying its partnerships. It will contribute to meeting global challenges such as health, climate and education. Its actions will be deployed on the basis of their impact on the ground and the results achieved.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 8

Guaranteed autonomy of assessment and decision-making sovereignty

373. By 2030, France will have autonomy of assessment and decision-making sovereignty, guaranteed in particular by the action of intelligence services and enhanced anticipation capabilities.

1. Assessment Of Measures Implemented Since the 2022 National Strategic Review

374. The work undertaken since 2022 has made it easier for intelligence services to work alongside the diplomatic and consular network to deal with the deterioration in the strategic landscape. In this respect, structural reforms have modernised and decompartmentalised the way the services operate. Their action has been structured and amplified, in particular to better understand and counter informational threats, the common denominator of many attacks against France, as part of the hybrid strategies deployed by strategic competitors.

375. The implementation of the reforms that had been announced will bring new levers of efficiency and agility to the intelligence services. Several ambitious reorganisations (Directorate General for External Security – DGSE, Directorate General for Internal Security – DGSI, Directorate for Military Intelligence – DRM, National Directorate for Customs Intelligence and Investigations – DNRED, National Directorate for Territorial Intelligence – DNRT) have been completed.

376. In addition, the objective of increasing anticipation and reaction capabilities has led to a systematic approach to coordination initiatives and the creation of intelligence exchange loops, including with the armed forces and the diplomatic network.

377. In the fight against information threats, intelligence services are now fully integrated within a structured, interministerial framework and contribute to:

- identifying and monitoring propaganda networks targeting the Nation's fundamental interests;
- characterising and analysing information attacks targeting national territory or France's interests abroad;
- responding to such attacks through an interministerial, interagency approach.

2. Action plan to achieve the strategic goal

2.1 Strengthening the State's intelligence and action capabilities in the face of a deteriorating global environment

378. National intelligence capabilities must provide decision-makers, in good time, with an informed assessment of the strategic context and the domestic situation, as well as reliable, relevant, current and exclusive information, according to the priorities set, upstream of a decision that affects the fundamental interests of the Nation or the security of its citizens.

379. The implementation of the new national intelligence strategy adopted in January 2025 should enable the introduction of new, sophisticated research and verification, information analysis and rapid reaction processes.

380. France must also have military intelligence capable of meeting the demands of warfare. This intelligence must assess the capabilities and potential courses of action, and where possible, the intentions of armed forces or groups likely to threaten French interests. It covers all areas of conflict and, in this context, analyses conventional and non-conventional weapons programmes, the innovation capacity of competitors, the morale of their defence and security forces, and the strength of their partners. Military intelligence must also enable the armed forces to plan and conduct operations. It covers all areas of conflict. In addition to military sensors, it draws on civilian or dual-use capabilities, particularly in the space sector.

2.2 Making intelligence contribute to the resilience of the Nation

381. In France, intelligence services must play their full part in responding to threats that erode the Nation's resilience and cohesion. The security services are mobilised to detect terrorist activities inspired by jihadism, infiltration within institutions, community withdrawal phenomena, the monitoring of potentially violent extremist groups, and the disruption of violent actions. Alongside the heads of the judiciary and the investigative services, the intelligence services will contribute to the prevention of organised crime.

382. The intelligence services will also be heavily involved in protecting the Nation's economic interests, in a context where rivalries between powers can shift to the economic sphere, through predatory actions, the instrumentalisation of the law and offensive customs policies. They will also have to take action against public finance fraud and corruption, which undermine cohesion, resilience and the Nation's ability to finance its structural investments, particularly in defence and security.

383. Intelligence services must pay particular attention to the overseas territories.

384. The latter must also contribute to the protection of the DITB, the SITB, and more broadly to the strategic sectors of the French overseas territories, such as the space sector. This issue covers the detection of predatory manoeuvres by foreign players against industrial flagships and questions relating to the security of major supplies, mainly raw materials.

2.3 Mobilising key human and technical resources

385. By 2030, the intelligence services will have a renewed strategy for attracting and retaining the best talent in all areas.

386. The services will increase the pooling of their technical resources, through new investments and capacity developments. The intelligence services will exploit the full potential of disruptive technologies by implementing the State's artificial intelligence and quantum technology strategies. Sovereign state-of-the-art technical expertise in the detection, gathering, decryption, processing and analysis of information, including space-based information, will also be strengthened. In addition, they will have to support sovereign industrial technology sectors in capability areas where strategic autonomy and resilience are paramount.

2.4 Strengthening ministerial and inter-ministerial anticipation

387. In order to help guide the action of government departments, particularly in their ability to deal with future crises, anticipation work[50] must be stepped up, with the aim of preventing the occurrence of events, where possible, or developing contingency planning. This should result in

[50] This refers to work carried out by the various government departments, and in particular that coordinated by the Interministerial Anticipation Committee (CIA) chaired by the SGDSN.

greater pooling of studies carried out by the ministries' anticipation units. In addition, as part of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs' early warning network, specific risk management work on a limited number of scenarios will now be carried out. Depending on the subject, the academic and economic-financial worlds will be more closely involved in this work.

388. The professionalisation of the anticipation and foresight functions and associated tools (e.g. wargaming and early warning and anticipation work, following the example of the Red Team Defence programmes and its successor Radar) must be pursued within the ministries.

389. Strategic research players also provide additional insight to internal expertise on emerging and complex phenomena and on strategic issues. They enrich collective thinking on knowledge, anticipation and foresight. In particular, French and foreign research institutes must be considered as full members of the ecosystem contributing to the design of the security and defence strategy. Their integration into this work and their support will be strengthened.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 9

The capacity to defend and act in hybrid fields

390. By 2030, France will have succeeded in constraining its adversaries, particularly Russia, and discouraging them from implementing their hybrid strategies. The State's defensive organisation and response capabilities will have been strengthened. These are essential for managing escalation, particularly in the five priority areas of hybrid warfare.

1. Assessment of measures implemented since the 2022 National Strategic Review

391. In February 2025, France adopted an interministerial doctrine for combating hybrid strategies[51], which confirms the decision to prioritise five areas in terms of their impact on its sovereignty and interests: cyber-attacks, information manipulation, lawfare, the economy and military operations. Efforts are nevertheless continuing to deal with attacks on a broader spectrum (space and infrastructure in particular).

392. Since 2022, in addition to the Cyber Crisis Coordination Centre (C4) for combating cyberattacks, the interministerial defensive structure for countering foreign digital interference has been strengthened through the Operational Committee for Countering Information Manipulation (COLMI), chaired by the SGDSN and coordinated by VIGINUM[52]. This will enable the implementation of an operational continuum recognised at European and international level, which will enable this major long-term threat to democracies to be taken into account.

393. At the same time, response capabilities have been expanded with the creation of dedicated services within the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Armed Forces. France is thus a pioneer in its ability to protect and respond, through measures such as refuting false claims, public exposure, European sanctions, reporting to online platforms, leveraging the EU Digital Services Act (DSA)[53] and supporting fact-checkers. Over the past two years, eleven reports have been published, notably on the Baku Initiative Group, an Azerbaijani state propaganda outlet, and pro-Russian campaigns such as RRN or *Matriochka*[54], with the aim of raising public awareness. VIGINUM and the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs have also made numerous reports to the operators of online platforms about informational manoeuvres based on inauthentic behaviour. These actions may have led to the suspension of the accounts involved.

[51] For France, a hybrid strategy refers to the use by a foreign actor of an integrated and deliberately ambiguous combination of military and non-military, direct and indirect, legal and illegal modes of action that are difficult to attribute. Playing with the estimated thresholds for retaliation and armed conflict, this combination is designed to constrain and weaken France and its partners.

[52] VIGINUM, the Vigilance and Protection Service against Foreign Digital Interference, is a defensive French operational service responsible for detecting and characterising foreign digital interference.

[53] The DSA aims in particular to strengthen the moderation of content on social networks and raise awareness among the general public.

[54] The RRN (Reliable Recent News) information manipulation campaign, which has targeted several European countries, including France, since 2022, aimed to discredit Western support for Ukraine. The Matryoshka campaign sought to discredit the media, public figures and fact-checking groups in more than sixty countries.

394. Since 2022, France has taken action to protect its interests against the threat of lawfare[55].

395. It has also strengthened its legal framework with the law of 25 July 2024 aimed at preventing foreign interference (Houlié Law). Measures have been introduced in the areas of transparency (foreign influence activity register), intelligence (experimental use of algorithms), deterrence (asset freezes, strengthened criminal penalties) and parliamentary information (report on the state of the threat).

396. In terms of economic security, France has continued to strengthen its protective measures, in particular to better guard against unwanted foreign takeovers. Similarly, the system steered by the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty was revitalised in 2022, based on the Blocking Act of July 1968, with the creation of a one-stop-shop provided by the Strategic Information and Economic Security Service (SISSE). The system for protecting the Nation's scientific and technical potential (PPST) against foreign attempts to capture it has also been reformed and extended. Finally, participation in European and G7 discussions has enabled better coordination in the face of threats of economic coercion. These measures have been supplemented by the adoption of an economic security doctrine.

397. The armed forces have also adapted their strategies to an interministerial and inter-allied approach in response to states that use information campaigns targeting local populations or authorities with the aim of generating hostility towards French forces. These states have also used armed groups or private military companies. The French armed forces have developed their influence and information warfare chain (monitoring, alert and response systems, strategic reporting, and diversification of cooperation offers to partner armed forces) to counter efforts to discredit their actions.

398. In June 2023, a military doctrine was drawn up on offensive IT capabilities, some elements of which have been made public[56]. These actions are strictly governed by the principles of jus in bello (proportionality, distinction and discrimination).

399. At the EU level, various tools have been put in place, with France's support, to combat hybrid threats (foreign interference, manipulation of information, computer attacks) in line with the Strategic Compass. The EU has also placed under sanctions individuals and entities involved in cyber-attacks attributed to Russia in May 2022 and May 2024, and imposed sanctions against those responsible for the RRN/*Doppelgänger*[57] campaign.

400. The strategic leverage offered by the EU has also been characterised by the establishment of a legal framework targeting those responsible for destabilising actions for the benefit of Russia, as well as by the implementation of the Digital Services Regulation, the European Economic Security Strategy and the Anti-Coercion Instrument.

401. At NATO, the principle that a hybrid attack should be considered as grounds for invoking Article 5, first mentioned in 2016, was reaffirmed at the Vilnius summit in 2023 and the Washington summit in 2024. Since 2022, work has also continued between the allies.

2. Action plan to achieve the strategic goal

2.1 Strengthening defensive organisation and response capabilities

402. Detection, action and response mechanisms in hybrid domains, particularly those relying on the intelligence community, will be reinforced to deter any adversary from carrying out attacks against France or its interests.

[55] Lawfare consists of three dimensions: normative lawfare (primarily the extraterritorial application of law), contentious lawfare (the instrumentalisation and misuse of national and international courts against French interests), and influence lawfare (attempts to interfere with the development of regulations and standards).

[56] www.defense.gouv.fr/comcyber/nos-operations/lutte-informatique-offensive-lio.

[57] This information manipulation campaign against France was led by Russia in 2023.

403. In the face of cyber-attacks, France will use all the levers at its disposal to halt the development of the threat and impose a higher cost on attackers, including by joining forces with its foreign partners. Coordination and the decision-making process will be improved.

2.2 Raising awareness in France

404. Efforts to raise French people's awareness of hybrid strategies will need to be stepped up.

405. A global strategy to combat information manipulation will be implemented, in particular to create the conditions for collective immunity to foreign digital interference (FDI), especially during election periods. The interministerial mechanism for combating foreign digital interference will be made more reactive and capable of responding decisively, and France's strategy of influence in the field of information will be overhauled.

2.3 Engaging in the regulatory competition against lawfare

406. France will continue developing tools to counter lawfare, particularly in the economic sphere, by mobilising the European level, which is essential for structuring an effective response.

2.4 Strengthening armed forces capabilities for better protection and action

407. By 2030, investment in human resources and digital technologies will increase the room for manoeuvre, contributing in particular to the increase in French military capabilities in the field of information linked to military operations.

2.5 Strengthening links with partners

408. France will continue its bilateral and multilateral coordination and action efforts, particularly within NATO and the EU, to strengthen the tools and strategies currently being developed.

409. It will also continue to combat the anti-Western narrative conveyed by certain strategic competitors. To these ends, France will coordinate its action with its allies and partners in order to counter influences where they threaten its interests and the converging interests of its allies and partners.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 10

The ability to achieve decisive outcomes in military operations

410. In 2030, France will have the means to preserve its freedom of action, show its determination and defend its interests in all fields and environments. It has the means to make a major contribution to European strategic autonomy, and to the defence of Europe, including by assuming with its main European partners the responsibilities of a framework nation.

411. The conflict in Ukraine marked the return of wars that could be imposed on France and Europe. In this context, France must be able to engage and prevail in a high-intensity confrontation[58] that would involve the entire Nation. This commitment could be decided following the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty or Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union, or as part of an ad hoc coalition or autonomous action, to defend national interests, respect a defence agreement or come to the aid of an ally or partner. At the same time, France must be able to participate in UN peacekeeping operations.

1. Assessment of measures implemented since the 2022 National Strategic Review

412. The resurgence of major threats since 2022 has led France to prioritise strategic solidarity in Europe and the consolidation of its role within NATO and the EU by deploying forces on Europe's eastern flank. It has also restructured its French military presence in Africa to better meet the expectations of local partners, regain greater freedom of action and counter the aggressiveness of competitors. Finally, it has diversified its partnerships and defined a new model of cooperation to strengthen its freedom of manoeuvre and support its exports.

413. At the same time, the armed forces have prepared for tougher combat in a multi-environment, multi-field (M2MC) and multinational context. They have adapted to be able to wage war against heavily armed adversaries, particularly in the European theatre. The Military Programming Law (LPM) has been adjusted from 2024 to consolidate combat capabilities and take advantage of new technologies: AI, munitions, surface-to-air defence, anti-drone warfare, light tactical drones and electromagnetic warfare. It provides for the doubling of reserves to strengthen the resilience of the armed forces.

414. Since the creation of the new strategic function, influence capabilities have been structured within the armed forces to counter competitors' informational attacks and prevent them from-undermining the legitimacy of France's military action, particularly among the populations in contact withdeployed forces. In this context, the armed forces are helping to combat hybrid strategies.

415. Finally, France has launched the development of military capabilities to broaden its spectrum of action in common spaces (asserting its presence, surveillance, deterrence and action). Competition

[58] High intensity is characterised by violent confrontations likely to lead to attrition and significant loss of life.

between nations for control of maritime areas, including the seabed, very high altitude (VHA) and outer space has intensified. The development by certain nations of military capabilities in each of these environments confirms that they are potential areas of confrontation.

2. Action plan to achieve the strategic goal

416. To defeat heavily armed adversaries who exploit new technologies, bypass or overwhelm the most sophisticated systems with mass-produced, low-cost equipment, and conduct hybrid campaigns to destabilise national territory, the armed forces must accelerate the transformation process launched since the 2022 National Strategic Review.

417. The rearmament effort aims to protect the core of national sovereignty, strengthen strategic solidarity between allies and partners, demonstrate credibility and determination from the competition phase, and manage escalation. This is based on a coherent armed forces structure and forces ready for immediate deployment, either independently or as part of a coalition.

2.1 Securing the core of national sovereignty

418. The protection of its territory and population remains France's absolute priority. To this end, the armed forces maintain permanent deterrence postures, air security, maritime protection, cybersecurity, and land-based protection in support of internal security forces. The protection of nuclear-related sites remains essential to ensuring deterrence. To adapt to changing threats, coordination between civil and military defence must be strengthened. The contribution of the armed forces must be more responsive and decentralised, in the same way as for the 2024 Olympic Games.

419. In the overseas territories in particular, France will consolidate its operational capabilities and its capacity to receive reinforcements in order to preserve its sovereignty and respond to domestic or regional crises.

420. It will renew its access strategy so that it has secure support points abroad by land, air or port, enabling it to conduct operations to evacuate nationals, provide humanitarian assistance or support operations of higher intensity.

421. To guarantee its freedom of action and the exercise of its full sovereignty, it is essential to have first-entry capabilities and robust, responsive force and power projection capabilities. The protection of strategic flows (trade, supplies, data) with resources adapted to the evolution of threats is an imperative.

422. The challenges posed by VHA must be taken into account and met with appropriate capability responses. In space, France will need to strengthen its capabilities to support military operations, deter any escalation, and constrain the manoeuvres of its adversaries. The military space architecture must therefore become more resilient and responsive, by improving synergy between traditional industrial players and those from the New Space and Next Space[59] sectors, diversifying sovereign, partnered and commercial capabilities based on circumstances and needs, shifting towards low Earth orbit constellations, and expanding the ground segment. Finally, to deny, disable or disrupt adversary space capabilities, France must acquire rapidly deployable capabilities or systems operated directly from the ground to enable a graduated and diversified approach to action in and towards space.

423. The current demographic decline requires the armed forces to consolidate their attractiveness, retention and combat readiness of the men and women who will remain the cornerstone of operational capabilities, even though certain functions will need to be automated. The prospect

[59] Next Space refers to an emerging concept that incorporates new elements in disruptive technologies, industrialisation, anticipation and new uses.

of wartime conditions requires anticipating major changes in scale and preparing reserves to ensure the armed forces have sufficient personnel, both in number and quality, to sustain high-intensity conflict over time.

2.2 Strengthening strategic solidarity

424. Only credible, concrete strategic solidarity will enable France and its allies to influence the geopolitical environment, confront the growing intensity of conflict, and prevent faits accomplis. For France, this means consolidating existing partnerships and building new ones to strengthen its situational awareness and freedom of action, increase the volume of available forces, and pool decisive capabilities.

425. France must be able to assume the role of framework nation at the operational level. As a European nation with nuclear capabilities, France must act as a driving force for strategic solidarity and a catalyst for coalitions. It will continue, among other efforts, its operational commitments to reassure European partners in the conventional domain and, to that end, will develop operational capabilities (deep strike, integrated air and missile defence) that will enhance the credibility of its commitment to Europe's sovereign defence.

426. France must also pursue military partnerships that meet the expectations of its partners. In this context, it will offer attractive, sustainable, long-term options that ideally complement those of its other allies. In Europe, joint operational readiness should be the main thrust of these partnerships. Outside Europe, partnerships capable of contributing to knowledge and anticipation, access to support points and strengthening the capabilities of the French armed forces must be given priority.

427. France will support its allies, particularly European ones, in the partnerships they are most likely to succeed in (integrated cooperation projects, support for military training, capability development, defence or security offers, etc.).

428. Aware that NATO remains the crucible of high-intensity preparation, France will have to be a clear and committed partner for its allies, to the benefit of an Alliance that is increasingly dissuasive. To achieve this, France will promote a common strategic culture and demonstrate its determination to defend European interests through concrete measures and risk-taking.

2.3 Demonstrating credibility and determination to win the war before the war

429. France must be able, alone or with its allies, to defend its interests and uphold international law from the competition phase onward. The operational effectiveness of its armed forces, the lethality of their capabilities, and the responsiveness of the command structure must serve to deter and intimidate competitors and adversaries. A willingness to accept greater risk, combined with initiative and agility, must underpin action to maintain the upper hand over adversaries.

430. France will continue to reject faits accomplis by supporting partners under attack, maintaining a presence in contested areas, and securing its maritime and air approaches, particularly overseas and in very high altitude domains.

431. Finally, the armed forces must provide options for influencing the dynamics of a conflict and controlling escalation in all areas, in particular through a reinforced and guaranteed shoulder between nuclear and conventional forces. Their operational deployments for reassurance, including in a trigger-wire logic, their investment in very high intensity capabilities and the development of new conventional capabilities (particularly in the field of conventional deep strikes and missile defence) will reinforce this shoulder, particularly in Europe.

2.4 An army ready for high-intensity confrontations

432. France must have armed forces ready for high-intensity warfare. Preparations must be made to ensure that the armed forces, their ecosystems and the Nation as a whole are ready to cope with a major engagement.

433. This requires an increase in the rearmament effort to achieve a sustainable, comprehensive, coherent model capable of adapting more quickly than that of the adversary. This model will need to be balanced between very high-tech decision-making weapons, which are essential for victory, and wear-and-tear and saturation capabilities (drones and robots in all environments, remotely-operated munitions) in large quantities, produced rapidly and at low cost. Certain decisive capabilities will need to be developed (logistics, support, electronic warfare, ground-to-air defence, deep fire, capabilities for destroying enemy defences as part of denial of access strategies, space). Stockpiles of munitions and spare parts must be built up to ensure the ability to sustain a long-term war effort.

434. Given the widespread use of access denial strategies, the armed forces must place particular emphasis on restoring the ability to suppress enemy defences by acquiring and combining suitable equipment (electronic warfare) and weaponry.

435. In order to achieve this armed forces model in the context of rapidly evolving technologies and threats, the ongoing revolution in capability development must be pursued. The war in Ukraine shows that new technologies, often from the civilian world, must be integrated into a continuous cycle of doctrinal evolution. It will also be necessary to accept, in a controlled manner and in line with the logic of promoting European champions, certain mutual European dependencies in specific production cycles or equipment, in order to fully benefit from faster acquisition, increased production rates and lower unit costs.

436. Operational readiness will be strengthened to make it more realistic and demanding.

437. To dominate and last in the face of heavily armed adversaries, France will rely on intelligence and the systematic combination of physical and intangible effects. It will be agile enough to acquire operational supremacy from time to time, thanks to extensive connectivity, decompartmentalised data management and high-performance information processing capabilities, as well as agility and subsidiarity of command. Capable of overcoming an initial shock, inflicting a high level of damage, gaining the upper hand and setting the pace, France will pose strategic dilemmas for its adversaries. The armed forces' ability to operate within an environment characterised by battlefield transparency and to conceal their intentions will be reinforced through mobility, unit stealth and deception.

438. The armed forces will rely on robust support structures capable of regenerating unit potential, replenishing stockpiles of munitions and spare parts, and sustaining forces both daily, during training and in operations. A suitable network of service providers, suppliers and manufacturers within national territory will contribute to achieving this objective.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 11

Supporting French and European sovereignty through academic, scientific and technological excellence

439. The acceleration of scientific and technological developments and their widespread use by France's competitors and adversaries is reaching an unprecedented level. This goes hand in hand with the strengthening of the strategic role of our universities and research institutions. To achieve academic, scientific and technological excellence by 2030, France must take steps to ensure excellence in research and create essential building blocks for French and European sovereignty and strategic autonomy.

1. Assessment of measures implemented since the 2022 National Strategic Review

440. Although Strategic Objective 11 was not formally identified in the 2022 National Strategic Review, several actions have been taken to ensure sovereign scientific and technological superiority.

441. In 2021, France adopted the Research Programming Law (LPR), a major funding initiative aimed at positioning the country at the forefront of global research to meet future challenges, enhance the attractiveness of scientific careers, and promote the diffusion of research within society and the economy.

442. In parallel, the France 2030 investment plan, with €54 billion allocated over five years, has been implemented. This plan specifically aims to build and consolidate French excellence in priority scientific fields or those likely to drive major transformations.

443. Investments have also been made in high-risk research programmes, to detect upstream fundamental or innovative research that could generate strategic conceptual or technological breakthroughs. The Interdisciplinary Centre for Defence and Security (CIEDS), created in 2021 to design and develop equipment for the defence sector, has contributed to this effort.

444. At the same time, it has been decided to create programme agencies to structure the research work linked to certain pre-identified strategic priorities (agriculture and food sovereignty; climate and biodiversity; energy, in particular decarbonised energy; digital software technologies; digital infrastructures; health; space).

445. The AI summit held in February 2025 demonstrated France's determination to be a leader in this field. Similarly, the Choose Europe for Science conference in May 2025 reaffirmed the fundamental values of France and Europe in science and technology, with concrete measures to attract the best international talent.

2. Action plan to achieve the strategic goal

446. France must first and foremost master its expertise, which means maintaining and preserving a pool of talent (students, experts, young researchers, senior researchers), particularly in the above-mentioned fields. It is also a question of striking the right balance between international

collaboration (necessary to develop cutting-edge technologies) and protection against attempts by competitors to hijack the industry.

447. On the other hand, it is essential to ensure substantial volumes of investment in research and innovation, whether public or private. We also need to be able to convert this innovation into products and services. The convergence of these different levers is necessary to preserve the country's prosperity and security.

448. In addition to securing and developing expertise in technological fields, significant investment in the strategic and academic sector is also needed to support and promote the ecosystem of education, research and debate on defence and security issues.

2.1 Creating the conditions for technological excellence

2.1.1 Anticipating and implementing the transfer of innovation to industry

449. Scientific research is the first building block of technological innovation. Innovation, the industrialisation of research and its scaling up are another critical building block of French sovereignty. France must therefore structure its efforts to detect, support and accelerate the development of critical technologies throughout the research and development cycle, from the territorial to the national level. This means reducing regulatory barriers and creating multi-stakeholder, public-private financing models tailored to the maturity of each project.

450. Technological mastery must also be accompanied by dedicated investment, particularly in technical testing capacity.

451. Following the example of quantum technology (supported by France 2030 and operated by BIP France and the Ministry of the Armed Forces procurement programme[60]), the continuum of funding and support should be extended to other technologies critical to our sovereignty, under the guidance of the programme agencies.

452. When technologies reach the right level of maturity, the creation of start-ups should be encouraged. In this respect, the "Deeptech" plan launched by the French government in 2019, which aims to triple the number of start-ups from laboratories, needs to be reviewed and strengthened.

2.1.2 Controlling key technological advances over the long term

453. Particular attention must be paid to the development and long-term control of fundamental technologies, including those that contribute to aircraft and nuclear safety, propulsion in all its forms (reactors, hypervelocity, nuclear), materials (fabrics, composites, metals, lining) and associated expertise (assembly, machining, production), and new energies.

454. The following technologies must be mastered at national level, without excluding, in certain areas, the possibility of co-development or co-production with trusted partners, particularly in Europe : directed energy weapons, hyper velocity, artificial intelligence, quantum, new forms of energy, stealth, autonomous systems, new communication technologies, electronic components, stealth, critical materials, data management; freedom of action and access to space, electronic warfare.

455. State project management and technological control of the two components of deterrence and its transmissions will also need to be strengthened over the next ten years, as part of their modernisation.

[60] The funding of research in public laboratories has enabled the creation of 6 quantum start-ups, most of which have been supported by BpiFrance and which have been included in the Ministry of the Armed Forces' Proqcima procurement programme.

2.1.2.1 Artificial intelligence and data management

456. France will position itself as a leader in artificial intelligence across the entire value chain, including mathematical theory, development of computing infrastructure, data analysis, storage and management, and the cross-cutting use of AI.

457. It is essential to strengthen the conditions for sovereign data management and storage to preserve independent analytical and interpretative capabilities and ensure the protection of national data. This requires observation, collection, classification, storage and computing capabilities and infrastructure. More specifically for AI, dedicated sovereign infrastructures, such as supercomputers and data centres, must be developed.

458. At the same time, France will have to develop an ambitious policy aimed at securing digital technologies and their uses. It will establish favourable conditions for strengthening cybersecurity in all research and industrial sectors, including data protection. To this end, the French government will support the development of a national private cloud offering and the secure protection of sensitive data (SecNumCloud standards). France will promote this ambition as part of the revision of the European cybersecurity certification framework.

2.1.2.2 Space

459. The development and acquisition of essential and useful sovereign space technologies must be ensured, in line with the national space strategy, in order to manage the necessary mutually guaranteed dependencies with our main partners, particularly in Europe. In particular, this means ensuring the sustainability of Europe's capacity for autonomous access to space, earth observation capabilities including signals of electromagnetic origin for intelligence purposes, space surveillance, telecommunications, navigation resources, capacity for action in space, and securing space systems.

2.1.2.3 Quantum

460. The quantum sector must be given particular investment. The implementation of the 2021 national strategy for quantum technologies[61] must continue to support the emergence of French and European companies capable of becoming global leaders in this field. The creation of a competitive industrial sector in the fields of quantum technology applications is therefore a goal to be achieved. Prioritising research at low maturity levels is also necessary.

461. In order to cope with the potential disruption of quantum computing, it is essential to ensure that the hardware side of quantum computing achieves full technological maturity. Setting up a national defence platform based on a hybrid approach combining high-performance computing and a quantum accelerator will contribute to sovereign control of the software aspects.

2.1.2.4 NRBC

462. France's capabilities in research, intelligence and technical expertise on NRBC (nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical) issues must be preserved. Particular attention should be paid to the disruptions caused by advances in biotechnology and the proliferation of new biological and chemical threats facilitated by the use of artificial intelligence.

[61] www.quantique.france2030.gouv.fr

2.1.2.5 Earth sciences

463. France must strengthen its autonomous capacities for assessment, analysis and anticipation in the earth sciences, a crucial issue of sovereignty. Climate change and associated extreme phenomena also mean that we need to anticipate changes in terms of the equipment and materials used.

2.1.3 Strengthening and developing strategic and critical thinking

464. A special effort needs to be made to build up a range of excellent training and research facilities that will enable the development of contextualised strategic thinking and the strengthening of critical thinking skills. Knowledge, understanding of international and global issues, and the ability to anticipate, must be strengthened as pillars of strategic autonomy in addition to technological mastery. Academic and university expertise must include nuclear issues, international power relations and understanding hybridity (particularly from the point of view of informational influence).

2.1.4 Training and attracting the best talent

465. France needs to attract the best, most innovative and visionary talent. In this context, the ability to train and upskill talent, particularly in strategic sectors, is a major challenge. France needs to ensure that existing training courses are better suited to the needs of reindustrialisation and sovereignty in critical sectors, by structuring priority sectors (those of the programme agencies already mentioned).

466. France's ability to train, attract and retain the best French and international students, scientists, researchers and engineers is just as essential at a time when the profession of teacher-researcher is becoming less attractive and the pool of talent is shrinking. It is a real vector of influence and a symbol of excellence. It must help to fill certain gaps and create long-term links that can be strategic in economic and political terms. The LPR must contribute to this.

2.2 Strengthening protection for research and technological development

467. When it comes to research and innovation, it is necessary to encourage international collaboration and cooperation while maintaining a balance between the development and renewal of skills and the protection of French research against attempts to capture it.

468. In this respect, the high risk of French knowledge and expertise being hijacked means that existing protection measures (PPST and restricted areas[62], securing sensitive infrastructures, etc.) need to be better coordinated. In particular, France will continue to monitor international university and scientific cooperation projects, such as draft agreements between institutions. Those involved (students, heads of institutions, directors of research units, researchers) will be given greater responsibility.

469. At European level, France will promote the dissemination of a research safety culture and the introduction of national protection instruments within the European Union.

470. The application of a strengthened digital security policy will improve the protection of sensitive data held by public and private entities.

471. France will strengthen its capacity to detect and prevent threats of foreign interference in its higher education and research establishments. It will ensure that its competitors cannot exploit research work.

[62] New regulatory framework for the PPST (PPST decree of 15 May 2024).

472. The awareness campaign targeting higher education institutions regarding security challenges and foreign interference must be strengthened to foster a shared culture and common response mechanisms, as these institutions act as sentinels with an essential early warning role for the protection of the Nation's scientific and technological potential (PPST) and the safeguarding of its fundamental interests (IFN).

WAYS AND MEANS

473. This third part of the National Strategic Review presents the courses of action and resources that have been identified. They are necessary to achieve the strategic objectives and deliver the updated 2030 ambition. These will be further detailed and set out in roadmaps, which each relevant ministry and service must consolidate within six months. Their implementation will be regularly monitored at the interministerial level. If necessary, these roadmaps will be adapted in response to evolving needs and circumstances.

474. The implementation of the programming laws and strategies of ministries involved in defence and national security (notably the Military Programming Law – LPM, the Ministry of the Interior's Orientation and Programming Law – LOPMI, the Ministry of Justice's Orientation and Programming Law – LOPJ, the Research Programming Law – LPR, and the transformation agenda currently being implemented by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs) contributes to delivering the 2030 ambition. These frameworks partly provide the funding for the sectoral strategies already in force, which have been recently adopted or are being finalised (National Resilience Strategy, National Cybersecurity Strategy, National Space Strategy, and National Strategy to Counter Information Manipulation), all of which are integrated into the roadmaps of the relevant ministries and services.

475. Nonetheless, in order to address the threat of a major conflict on the European continent and its possible consequences for national territory, budgets will need to be increased to accelerate France's rearmament, decisively pivot towards high-intensity capabilities, and enhance the resilience of the Nation.

476. The challenges to be met in terms of national security and defence require the notion of the Nation's higher interest to be given its rightful place. Concrete measures must be adopted to adapt the legislative, regulatory and normative framework to the operational requirements of ambition 2030, in strict compliance with individual freedoms and the highest and most fundamental legal standards.

477. Finally, the development of a European defence must be encouraged, in terms of standards, budgetary instruments and operational capabilities. France must remain proactive and support a step change that enables Europeans to take on greater responsibilities through a more sovereign European defence.

1. Protecting the Nation and strengthening cohesion and resilience among its key actors

1.1 Improving our legislative and regulatory framework

478. The law on the resilience of critical infrastructure and the strengthening of cybersecurity (transposing the European REC, NIS 2 and DORA directives) will significantly improve the physical and digital protection of operators of vital importance (OIV), their critical infrastructure, essential and important entities, and organisations in the financial sector. By 2029, an assessment will be carried out to evaluate the operational implementation of these measures and determine whether additional legislative reinforcement is required, particularly to address major shortcomings and to incorporate environmental risk into the resilience of OIVs and their critical infrastructure.

479. The possibility of a broader legislative framework will be explored to introduce measures that strengthen national resilience beyond these specific areas, in light of the new geostrategic context. This would include measures such as a strategic stockpiling policy, ministry-level application of national defence and security stages and a comprehensive national defence and security plan, reform of National Resilience Day, greater harmonisation, incentives, operational improvements, and funding for reserve and volunteer schemes, including the diplomatic reserve.

480. In anticipation of potential consequences for national territory in the event of a conflict occurring outside French territory, the legal provisions governing the operational defence of the territory, dating back to 1993, will be updated to reflect the current context and identified threats, and to facilitate the organisation and coordination of national defence and security missions.

481. Work will be initiated to complete the legal arsenal available to the authorities in criminal matters, particularly with regard to the fight against foreign digital interference, as part of an integrated global approach to response and influence in the field of information. This work will pay particular attention to the need to address our vulnerabilities during election periods.

1.2 National mobilisation

1.2.1 Rethinking citizen engagement

482. The "Defence and Citizenship Day" is currently being restructured. A digital platform will better guide and direct young people, based on their skills and desire to engage, towards three pathways: the national security reserve[63], the national security service[64], and the pool of volunteers and civilian contributors[65].

483. The capacity to mobilise citizens will be strengthened, particularly at local level. As part of a renewed and expanded National Guard encompassing all relevant schemes, the national security reserve and the national security service will be further operationalised starting in 2025. Reserve, volunteer and civic engagement programmes will also be made more reliable and consistent, with improved resources for effectively recruiting volunteers by 2026, with a particular focus on the departmental level. Legal adjustments may also be proposed to remove identified barriers to the recruitment of reservists and volunteers.

484. The IT system for the coordinated management of these reserve and volunteer schemes will be developed and a study will be carried out between now and the end of 2026 on ways of strengthening the incentive to get involved. A guide to all the reserves and volunteering tools will also be drawn up and widely distributed to guide volunteers towards the most suitable schemes.

485. For the armed forces and internal security forces, from 2026 onwards, the continued increase in the number of operational reserve personnel and the number of days of activity, as well as the introduction of dedicated training courses, will enable the reserve forces to be integrated more rapidly with the active forces. This will be accompanied by an increase in equipment. Reservists will then be employed primarily on security and protection missions for the national sanctuary, as back-up for support services or as part of forces deployed on external operations.

486. By 2026, the French Defence Procurement Agency (DGA), in coordination with the main companies of the Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DITB), will have completed the work required to establish the defence industrial reserve, in line with the work on its operational reserve.

487. In the overseas territories, by 2030, the Adapted Military Service (SMA) will have a modernised educational framework and will strengthen its role as a facilitator and interface between young people and the socio-economic environment of the territories. Staff numbers will be increased and the range of training courses refocused. It will provide a strengthened crisis response capability for civil security missions, in support of the armed forces and internal security forces: In addition to its training dimension, the SMA acts as a driving force for the influence and resilience of overseas France.

488. The reference framework for interministerial national defence and security stages will be adopted in 2026 as part of a truly interministerial approach. It will enable ministries and government services to step up and coordinate their response to the various types of threat in the context of the scale

[63] The purpose of this reserve is to reinforce core sovereign missions, including all military reserves, the gendarmerie, internal security forces, prison administration, customs, and healthcare.

[64] The national security service aims to ensure the continuity of operations for operators of vital importance and the economic continuity of actors within the defence and security industrial base.

[65] This pool includes all other forms of engagement within various institutions or associations that may contribute to the continuity of national life (volunteer firefighters, regional health agency (ARS) volunteers, civic service missions, and various associations).

scenario identified in this review for the national territory[66]. It will have to provide for a clear articulation between the competencies of the administrative and military authorities as well as an adaptation of the normative framework according to the context.

489. At the same time, a resilience guide will be sent to the whole population in 2025. The mechanisms for informing citizens about risks and threats will be renewed, and new communication vectors identified to reach as many people as possible by early 2026. Educational modules on defence issues will be offered as part of civic education courses.

490. At the same time, the State will support local authorities in identifying citizens with special skills and businesses that could provide assistance in the event of a crisis. It will support them in drawing up and regularly assessing their protection plans, which should be finalised as soon as possible. It will also increase its capacity to support them by renovating the zonal and departmental operational centres. Prefectures will be reinforced to support awareness-raising, training, preparation, and local partner ecosystem knowledge, particularly to contribute to economic security at the local level, but also to improve prevention, detection, and the fight against separatism and Islamist infiltration.

491. The specific characteristics of the overseas territories (exposure to major risks, insularity, etc.), their intrinsic resources, and their particular vulnerabilities will be given special consideration. Regional cooperation will be developed for this purpose, in the short term, by each overseas department, region and territory, across all areas of security, with support from French operators such as the Research Institute for Development (IRD), the French Development Agency (AFD), Business France, and others.

1.2.2 Optimising and protecting scientific and technological potential

492. A genuine common security culture based on a vision of the challenges of scientific and technical cooperation and risk analysis will be established by 2027, while recognising the need for international openness to guarantee the Nation's scientific and technological excellence. This will involve the systematic introduction of measures to protect research and raise awareness among students, researchers and lecturers, as well as renewed governance measures. To achieve this, the network of security and defence officers (FSD) will be extended, as will the government services responsible for protecting the country's economic, industrial and scientific potential (notably within the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty, the Ministry of National Education, Higher Education and Research and the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs). Controls on international cooperation under the PPST will be strengthened by setting up dedicated databases and adapting the Education Code to the new challenges.

493. As part of the work on the European security strategy initiated in 2024, France will contribute to a shared analysis of the risks of capture and predation, particularly in the field of disruptive technologies. On the basis of this analysis, and where appropriate, the coordinated introduction of new national protection and controls systems will be envisaged by 2026-2027.

494. At the same time, measures to attract students, researchers, scientists and engineers will be consolidated and strengthened – both to attract talent fromabroad and to prevent French and European talent from leaving the country.

[66] Scenario of a major high-intensity war in Europe's neighbourhood leading to concomitant destabilising actions on national territory.

1.2.3 Strengthening the organisation of cyber security

495. In the field of cybersecurity, the launch from 2026 of a scholarship programme designed to make digital security professions more accessible and to make up for a shortfall in the workforce, will help to make France one of Europe's largest breeding grounds in this area.

496. Finally, a national digital risk prevention brand, recognised by the general public and led by the Public Interest Group for Action Against Cyber Malicious Activity (GIP ACYMA) as part of its prevention mission, will be launched by 2026[67].

1.2.4 Resources to combat organised crime and drug trafficking

497. The fight against transnational organised crime requires better knowledge of criminal networks through increased coordination of intelligence services. Similarly, the use of human and technical resources will be optimised as quickly as possible. Public officials must also be protected against corruption. Finally, targeting all criminal networks, this fight will be conducted through enhanced international and national coordination, and will involve all government services in the regions.

1.3 Resources to meet the challenge

1.3.1 Strengthened national defence and security planning and crisis management capabilities

498. Defence and security planning will be optimised by 2026. In particular, implementation of the Interministerial General Directive on National Defence and Security Planning[68] will be expanded to provide a general catalogue of measures designed to address all identified risks and threats. This work will be coordinated by the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, in collaboration with the ministries, and aligned with ongoing efforts to update the VIGIPIRATE system and implement integrated, civil-military national defence and security stages, which will follow the same timeline.

499. Ministries, central and local administrations, military commands and forces, agencies and regional authorities will develop and strengthen their crisis management capabilities within their respective areas of responsibility, in coordination with the SGDSN. Scaling resources appropriately (human resources, coherence of training and crisis roles), improving interoperability through modernised equipment, securing crisis communications, ensuring adequate logistical and support means, and sharing adopted measures[69] will all be essential to strengthening state resilience. Each ministry will also be responsible for the regular organisation of crisis management exercises. Major exercises to test interministerial coordination and overall resilience will be held annually.

1.3.2 Strengthening the continuity of critical supplies

500. First, real-time analysis of supply chains and value chains will be implemented by 2026, through the creation of a digital tool using customs data. At the same time, ministries and operators of vital importance (OIV) will define and regularly update the list of goods essential to the continuity of national life. They will specifically assess the level of criticality and dependency for these goods. The purpose of this mapping is to establish reserves that ensure sufficient autonomy during the first weeks of a major conflict that could disrupt national supply routes, and to secure supply guarantees. This work may also cover the conversion of the civilian economy and civilian stockpiles.

[67] This will notably take the form of a national cybersecurity portal to provide clear information to the public, guide users towards available support schemes, and assist them with cybersecurity-related procedures.

[68] Interministerial General Directive No. 320 SGDSN/PSE/PSN dated 23 January 2023.

[69] Via the ATHENA tool.

501. Particular attention will be paid to the specific case of overseas territories, given their potential (geostrategic, economic, military) as well as their constraints (remoteness, insularity, heavy dependence on logistics chains) and the need to guarantee the continuity of their critical supplies.

502. Remedial measures (relocation, pre-positioning, diversification, possibly constitution of a strategic stockpile[70]) for vital goods defined as such, will be established and fully deployed by 2030[71]. At the same time, the production capacities of the key sectors enabling an emergency capacity increase will be identified at the beginning of 2026. The Interministerial Delegation for Securing the Supply of Strategic Minerals and Metals (DIAMMS) will incorporate these elements into its work.

1.3.3 Guaranteed energy resilience

503. Continuity of electricity and energy supply will be the subject of a dedicated budgetary effort to ensure the resilience and energy security of the national economy and the Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DITB).

504. The revival of civil nuclear power will make it possible to secure the production of carbon-free energy in France. This will involve the construction of new EPR 2 nuclear reactors, the first of which will be commissioned by the end of the 2030s. Work to close the fuel cycle will also, in time, drastically reduce the need for natural uranium to run reactors, leading to sovereignty in terms of electricity production.

1.3.4 Investment in cyber security

505. In the field of cybersecurity, investment in the technologies of the future and in securing the digital foundations of the French economy (networks, cloud, software, computing, AI) and society will be made to enable France to master its dependencies and retain its freedom of action (critical innovative cybersecurity technologies – post-quantum cryptography, confidential computing[72]; exploitation and processing of mass data; use of AI tools ; reinforcement of French capacity on the subject of evaluation; launch of coordinated standardisation initiatives on cybersecurity).

506. The use of public procurement and the increased mobilisation of private investors will be systematised to support research, the development of the cybersecurity industry and the consolidation of the sector. Similarly, the deployment of programmes to support organisations in improving their cybersecurity will be launched from 2025 using initial funding. In 2026, the priority sectors for these support programmes will be local authorities, universities, public research laboratories, and the most critical companies within the Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DITB) and the Security Industrial and Technological Base (SITB).

507. Starting in 2025, the State will relaunch an ambitious interministerial initiative to develop new ranges of digital security products, particularly encryption equipment, to meet the sovereign needs of both the State and the European Union, following interministerial, multi-year budget planning.

508. To strengthen and sustain regional CSIRTs, France will also implement multi-year State-Region co-financing from 2026. Special attention will be given to ensuring the long-term viability of overseas CSIRTs, particularly in the overseas territories.

509. Finally, a public-facing cybersecurity filter to block access to malicious websites will be rolled out in 2025.

[70] Specific work will be carried out to establish and maintain strategic stockpiles of key critical materials, either by the State or by private sector actors. This includes semiconductors, mineral resources, hydrocarbons, and components for which a single-source dependency – such as China – has been identified.

[71] Subsequent budgetary volumes have yet to be determined and will be decisive in the capacity to achieve our ambitions.

[72] Confidential computing is a technology that makes it possible to protect data even when it is being used by computer systems.

1.3.5 Capacity to deal with health risks and the consequences of climate change

510. In order to be able to take climate change issues into account, the State will maintain its independent observation and analysis capabilities and increase its national response capacity to natural disasters and the effects of climate hazards by strengthening the capabilities of civil security actors and their support as soon as possible (creation of permanent civil security detachments in the Indian Ocean, French Guiana and the Antilles, increase in civil security capabilities, etc.). Support from the armed forces and the use of any European support mechanisms may be sought.

511. In response to health risks, the implementation by the relevant ministries of the national response plan for pandemics caused by infectious, accidental or deliberate diseases transmissible between humans will be accelerated. This plan will be rolled out at national and regional level. It will require, in particular, the maintenance of inventories of protective and hygiene equipment. In addition, an industrial policy for national and European production capacities for health products must be defined as soon as possible.

512. Achieving these ambitions will require guaranteeing the excellence of French scientific expertise.

2. Strengthening strategic autonomy and ensuring sovereign and credible capacity for action

2.1 Strengthening the diplomatic network and resources

513. The implementation of France's diplomatic priorities, set by the President of the Republic on 16 March 2023 following the National Conference on Diplomacy[73], will continue, along with the human and material reinforcement of the country's diplomatic capabilities in support of these objectives. To this end, the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs will continue to ramp up its political analysis of crisis areas and global issues, as well as its monitoring, information response and influence, particularly in Europe, Africa, the Near and Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific. It will maintain its capacity to respond to crises and coordinate emergency humanitarian aid at the national level, in particular through the interministerial crisis and support centre, whose resources will be strengthened. It will also continue to support the humanitarian efforts of international organisations capable of responding quickly, effectively and on a large scale, such as the ICRC, UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF, whose long-term sustainability is essential to the entire humanitarian system. This includes, for example, the work of the ICRC and the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service, operated by the WFP, in some of the world's most hard-to-reach crises.

514. The security of our diplomatic missions and expatriate communities, on the one hand, and the strengthening and resilience of the global interministerial communications network[74], on the other, both of which play a key role in exercising our strategic autonomy and preserving our freedom of action, will be reinforced this year.

515. The Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs will continue its digital transformation by developing sovereign and secure tools and increasing the resources dedicated to digital transformation, starting in 2025. This transformation will build on the opportunities offered by artificial intelligence, particularly for the ministry's translation, monitoring, analysis and communication activities, in order to confirm its pioneering role in the use of these solutions. In addition, the ministry will continue to strengthen the security of voting systems for French citizens abroad, contributing to the resilience of the country's democratic processes.

516. A citizen diplomatic reserve will be established this year, coordinated by the Diplomatic and Consular Academy (ADC), whose enhanced role in training will be actively supported. This reserve will not only mobilise a core group of volunteer diplomats but also former participants from certain

[73] Agile diplomacy in a changing world; diplomacy with partners; diplomacy for the common good; diplomacy for the French people; diplomacy of talent.

[74] Operated by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs.

ADC training programmes, staff from operators under the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, and eventually, alumni from French networks abroad. The reserve will be called upon for its expertise and to support diplomatic efforts on specific projects. A target of 1,000 reservists by the end of 2025 is being considered. Strengthening this reserve will require adjustments to the existing legal framework for civic reserves.

517. In the overseas territories, France will support the membership and participation of local authorities in regional organisations (ROs), while also strengthening its own representation, particularly in the Pacific. Ties with European Union delegations and entities present in these sub-regions will also be reinforced. State-local authority consultation mechanisms to define common positions within these ROs will be strengthened in the short term. For the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic zone, the goal is to adopt strategic guidance documents between the State and local authorities by 2026. Thematic areas of cooperation will be expanded based on the specific characteristics of each zone (security, fisheries, environment, scientific research).

2.2 Legal safeguards and simplification of regulatory frameworks

518. Legal instruments will be deployed as soon as possible to strengthen the fight against terrorism (including the introduction of mandatory psychiatric assessments for individuals under monitoring for terrorist radicalisation who show signs of psychiatric disorders), as well as against violent extremism, separatism, and security breaches, in order to safeguard sites and personnel within government services.

519. Starting this year, ministries (Ministry of the Armed Forces and Ministry of the Interior in particular) will propose measures to simplify applicable regulations[75] based on the threat levels France or its allies may face. This will include activating differentiated derogation powers or streamlined legal frameworks in various pre-identified areas of law to meet defence and national security needs. The preparation of such intermediate legal frameworks, positioned between a state of peace and a state of war, will be the subject of legislative work, as they are particularly necessary for defining interministerial national defence and security stages.

520. Although it already contains tools to deal with certain emergencies and exceptional circumstances, the public procurement code must be subject to further studies specific to defence and security in order to speed up the procurement process for military equipment and facilitate scale-up after testing. Such adjustments could be made as part of the revision of the European directive on defence and security procurement, scheduled for 2026. In the immediate term, the threshold for competitive tendering for innovative defence contracts should already be raised to the maximum level provided for by European law.

2.3 Structuring our industrial and hybrid response capabilities

2.3.1 Consolidated industrial organisations for the benefit of the armed forces and internal security forces

521. Several measures have been identified with regard to the resources required for defence.

522. To ensure support for the armed forces and allied forces on national territory, a network of actors, service providers, suppliers and manufacturers must be identified, spread across the entire value chain, including among our European partners. Strong interministerial and European synergies are possible. This work will be coordinated by the CIDN from 2025.

523. In terms of security capabilities, the Ministry of the Interior will strengthen the organisation of the Security Industrial and Technological Base (SITB) from 2025 to ensure it can deliver the essential

[75] For example, in areas such as environmental regulations, urban planning, the highway code, accessibility for persons with reduced mobility, pyrotechnic safety (infrastructure and weapon systems), or aircraft airworthiness.

solutions for reinforcing national security, protecting networks and critical entities and maintaining security continuity with the armed forces. The State will similarly encourage industrial players to align their production with its requirements and those of the entities concerned so that key technologies remain under national and European sovereignty.

524. From 2025, the Ministry of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of the Interior will establish partnerships with companies outside the defence sector to enable, if necessary, the mass production of certain pre-identified military components or equipment, complementing the production capacities of the Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DITB) and the Security Industrial and Technological Base (SITB).

525. At the same time, in order to increase the resilience of the subcontracting chain, the Ministry of the Armed Forces will identify potential alternative sources among its European partners by 2025, to be activated if necessary, in line with the level of sovereignty required for the design, production and maintenance of weapons systems in operational condition. The Ministry of the Armed Forces will ensure that industrial prime contractors provide their subcontractors with the necessary visibility on future activity and commit to providing, through advances or contract payments, the financial resources necessary to strengthen their subcontractors.

526. Finally, the Ministry of the Armed Forces will define a roadmap for 2026 identifying the desired level of sovereignty (national control, control through cooperation or recourse to the market) in terms of defence system design, production and maintenance capabilities.

2.3.2 A strengthened organisation in hybrid domains

527. Relevant administrations will continue their efforts to report inauthentic behaviours to online platforms and to contribute to investigations into platforms' moderation failures under the EU Digital Services Act (DSA). They will also strengthen their operational capabilities[76], and an AI[77] centre of excellence and an academy[78] for combating information manipulation will be created within VIGINUM. The establishment of regional VIGINUM delegates will be considered.

528. The French system for combating information manipulation will be strengthened by 2026. In particular, electoral processes will continue to be specially protected under a revised and strengthened legal framework.

529. France will also incorporate the work carried out at EU and NATO level into its approach.

530. In the field of strategic communication, the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs will also bolster the human and financial resources of embassy press services and of its press and communication directorate dedicated to strategy, content production and dissemination.

531. At the same time, AI and cybersecurity expertise will be strengthened within ANSSI from 2025 onward to ensure a sovereign assessment of AI system security and to develop the necessary capabilities, notably through the National Institute for AI Evaluation and Security (INESIA).

[76] In particular through the establishment by the MEAE of a regional monitoring network in several embassies located in priority language hubs (Taipei, Doha, Tbilisi, Abuja, Mexico City and Washington).

[77] This centre of excellence will be prefigured at the end of 2025 by the establishment of a joint VIGINUM-INRIA laboratory.

[78] This academy will aim in particular to develop tools for civil society. It will enable large-scale action to be taken among all citizens (schools, universities, businesses, journalists and the media, civil servants, cultural and scientific circles in particular), notably by making educational resources available from the start of the 2025 school year to raise awareness among an entire age group (i.e. around 650,000 to 800,000 students aged 13 to 14).

2.4 Consolidation of existing resources and development of new ones

2.4.1 Intelligence and data processing

532. In the field of intelligence, short- and medium-term efforts will aim to preserve existing technical and operational capabilities and develop new ones (observation, interception and exploitation capabilities; mass data processing; integration of AI; anticipation of disruptive technologies; etc.). In particular, the challenge of mass data processing using AI will need to be addressed.

533. This challenge will be the subject of immediate efforts to enable the armed forces to speed up decision-making processes during operations. The data-centric digital revolution will be extended to as many weapon systems as possible. Storage capacities and connectivity networks will be divided between legacy assets and commercial services[79]. Computing capabilities dedicated to military AI will be expanded and modernised beginning in 2028. The development of a combat cloud will be accelerated by 2028. The aim is to deliver AI all the way to the frontline soldier.

534. The issue of the rise of national OSINT (open source intelligence) capabilities will be studied in depth by the end of 2026 in order to provide France with real capabilities in this area.

2.4.2 Armed forces and defence funding

535. With regard to the armed forces, the acceleration of capability efforts, supported by the necessary revolution in this field, will focus on strengthening the foundation, protection, offensive capabilities and command capabilities (digital and connectivity). These efforts will focus in particular on ammunition, drones and remotely operated munitions, the suppression of enemy defences, ground-to-air defence and anti-drone warfare, electromagnetic warfare, deep strike capabilities including conventional missile strike capabilities, maritime domain control and fighter aviation, transport aviation and the ability to command, support and sustain the operational-level land component of a coalition (framework nation).

536. In space, the deployment of low Earth orbit constellations (for observation and high-throughput communications[80]) will be accelerated. Imagery- and electromagnetic-derived intelligence will be reinforced from 2027 onward, notably by leveraging the capabilities offered by New Space and Next Space. Space action assets will be procured beginning in 2026. Ground-to-low orbit surveillance capabilities will be increased by 2029. The armed forces will have sensors and detection capabilities at very high altitudes before 2030. European partners and cooperating countries will be mobilised to this end in a European champion approach, coordinated with redefined priorities and increased budgetary resources at EU level where necessary.

537. The strengthening of the armed forces' health service and the modernisation of its support and supply capabilities will be effective from 2026. Collaboration with the Ministry of Health will continue on planning for the reception of large numbers of wounded personnel on national territory in the event of a major engagement.

538. In the field of defence, public and private investors will be mobilised with the aim of investing up to an additional €5 billion in the DITB. Similarly, the use of existing resources will be optimised[81] and innovative financing will be proposed by the Ministry of the Armed Forces, in close collaboration with the Ministry of National Education, Higher Education and Research, and programme agencies, to promote the emergence of disruptive technologies. A sector-wide dialogue between representatives of financial institutions and the defence industry will be launched in 2025 to strengthen ties between the two sectors.

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[79] *Secure* clouds, low-orbit satellite communications, and frugal and resilient radio technologies.

[80] Such as the IRIS^2 programme.

[81] A study will be launched to assess the possibilities for a significant increase in the "Art. 90" mechanism, which provides cash flow facilities.

539. The Ministry of the Armed Forces will also experiment with collaboration with start-ups via a trusted third party from 2026, enabling development and experimentation without recourse to public procurement and subsidies. It will seek to maximise synergies with the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, which are engaged in similar processes and have already established promising partnerships with French AI start-ups.

540. At the same time, between now and 2027, the Ministry of the Armed Forces, in conjunction with the local authorities' economic development departments, will gradually implement programmes to accelerate industrial performance. The aim is to support around a hundred DITB subcontractors, considered to be bottlenecks, in the necessary adaptation of their industrial tools (work organisation, investment in machinery, resilience) in order to cope with increases in production rates.

541. Finally, as an extension of the work on reassessing the strategic fleet, from 2026 onwards, work will begin on drawing up a list of ships that can be requisitioned and on maximising the benefits of the "containerisation" of capabilities (medical, intelligence, etc.).

2.4.3 Internal security forces

542. The Ministry of the Interior will launch a review of the capabilities of the internal security and civil protection forces in light of evolving threats, in preparation for the next Orientation and Programming Law of the Ministry of the Interior. The new requirements will be fully defined, notably through an operational contract framework tailored to the central scenario of the National Strategic Review[82].

543. These capability enhancements should enable both active and reserve units to become more deterrent, autonomous and responsive. They will focus in particular on: the hardening of equipment and weaponry; ensuring a qualitative and quantitative baseline of vehicles, equipment and materiel for units responsible for law enforcement and public security; the armoured component; individual and collective protection systems; national projection and transport capabilities (including the creation of a heavy-lift helicopter capability); appropriate support and sustainment functions; the State's response capacity to natural disasters and climate hazards; counter-drone measures; control of maritime approaches, particularly in the overseas territories; and the securing and upgrading of facilities (prefectures, gendarmerie barracks, police stations, etc.).

544. The establishment of tactical and technical interoperability between the internal security forces and the armed forces (mutual understanding, intelligence sharing, interconnection of communications systems[83], sharing of tactical situations, mutual knowledge of operational frameworks and plans, etc.) must also be actively pursued from now on.

2.4.4 Defence and security capabilities in the overseas territories

545. In the overseas territories, the capabilities of the armed forces will be strengthened to improve surveillance of sovereign areas, establish support points and intervene without warning in their area of responsibility, and receive reinforcements from mainland France. By 2030, they will have nearly 1,000 additional military personnel, modernised equipment (Scorpion, drones, maritime patrol vessels, etc.), enhanced command capabilities and appropriate operational infrastructure.

546. In the area of internal security, the capacity enhancements mentioned above will be given particular attention, particularly with regard to: national projection and transport capacity; means of responding to natural disasters and the effects of climate hazards, taking into account the

[82] See conclusion of part 1.

[83] This could also benefit the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs.

constraints of remoteness and insularity of overseas territories; means of controlling maritime approaches; securing and developing land use.

547. A communication doctrine should also be developed as soon as possible, consolidating the outreach, anticipation and crisis management capabilities of overseas defence and security zones against natural risks. Regular awareness-raising on all forms of foreign interference must also be ensured in order to strengthen vigilance and prevention among the various local actors (institutional, economic, academic, etc.) against the influence and interference of strategic competitors directly targeting French overseas territories because of their strategic importance but also because of their remoteness.

2.4.5 Development of disruptive technologies

548. To support the development of strategic technologies, the Research Programming Law (LPR) will be secured and strengthened. It is the best vehicle for achieving academic, scientific and technological excellence and promoting the transfer of innovation (the financial trajectory of the space sector is governed in particular by the LPR). This programming law will support the long-term establishment of programme agencies focusing on strategic research themes, develop high-risk research programmes and priority research programmes and equipment (PEPR), and encourage the emergence and establishment of strategic training courses for French sovereignty and technological leadership.

549. The definition of a new future investment programme (PIA), following on from "France 2030", will, among other things, support the long-term establishment of programme agencies beyond 2026 and accelerate the Deep Tech plan[84].

550. The development of priority technologies (notably AI and quantum) will be ensured through the strengthening of "high-risk" research and the funding of supercomputers and data centres dedicated to these disruptive technologies. An interministerial "priority technologies" roadmap will be established in 2026. Milestones may be defined for the delivery of both military and civilian demonstrators. The investment plan supporting strategic demonstration activities to showcase French industrial capabilities, notably those of the Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DITB), can be coordinated with this roadmap.

551. In particular, the PROQCIMA project to develop a sovereign quantum-computing capability at the highest global level will be supported, with the aim of producing prototype universal quantum computers by 2032.

3. Contributing to European and international security

3.1 Containing regulatory inflation and sharing best practices

552. In terms of regulations, France will work from 2025 onwards to promote greater regulatory stability in order to provide visibility for European defence companies and enable them to adapt to the many standards already in force. At the same time, it will work to simplify existing regulations and monitor the impact of cross-cutting regulations (such as REACH[85]) on production chains in the defence and security sector, potential performance losses and increased costs for military equipment.

553. Per the European directive on defence and security procurement[86], which already offers a number of possibilities in relation to current challenges, France is now proposing that Member States share best practices in order to optimise the implementation of the directive. The aim is, in particular, to

[84] The Deep Tech plan was launched in 2021. It aims to respond to the urgent need to support very high-level innovation to enable France to position itself as a leader in strategic technology fields.

[85] European regulation on the risks to human health and the environment of chemical substances.

[86] Directive 2009/81/EC.

facilitate procurement and, from 2025, to allow the choice of suppliers in the context of joint procurement.

3.2 Concerted action in Europe, influence on the international stage

3.2.1 European funding initiatives

554. To give substance to the White Paper on European defence, the defence ministries of certain European countries will create new capability coalitions. France will play its full part in this initiative, which aims to synchronise the rearmament of European countries in order to benefit from existing industrial capabilities, achieve economies of scale, optimise production tools and jointly finance poolable strategic capabilities. Work to identify initial joint projects will be consolidated from 2026 onwards. In view of Europe's rearmament needs, France will propose innovative cooperation models aimed at more ambitious lead times based on strong and more effective governance.

555. In this context, France will support European preference (design European, produce European, buy European), both in EU negotiations and in the conclusion of bilateral agreements, particularly with a view to consolidating the European pillar of NATO through joint or cross-acquisitions from the EDTIB.

556. In parallel, under the EDIP and SAFE regulation proposals, France will continue to promote European-preference criteria and the subsidy mechanism for industrial production capacities created by the ASAP regulation, which has proven particularly effective and useful in financing Eurenco's Bergerac facility. It will propose establishing production lines for European manufacturers elsewhere in Europe and will seek to develop cross-border supply chains to enhance the resilience and autonomy of the EDTIB.

3.2.2 Combating international information manipulation

557. In the field of combating information manipulation, the relevant administrations will strengthen bilateral and multilateral dialogue and international partnerships in 2026, particularly around the continuation of capacity-building programmes led by VIGINUM and through French and European cooperation mechanisms under the aegis of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (media cooperation, Weimar Triangle, European External Action Service early warning system). To this end, they will be able to draw on dedicated resources.

558. Scientific work, access to archives and debate among historians must serve to consolidate shared memories, particularly in relation to and in partnership with European nations. Strengthening joint commemorations and remembrance activities on shared combat history should help to strengthen ties with France's partners and allies in support of traditional diplomatic channels, from cultural agreements to defence agreements and the fight against information manipulation.

3.2.3 Intelligence cooperation

559. Intelligence, which is the responsibility of individual states, must be shared more effectively at the European level, between services, but also with European Union institutions through the SIAC[87], which must remain the single point of entry for intelligence sharing in the EU. In this regard, France will seek to propose ways of improving synergies in this area with EU Member States while preserving their prerogatives.

3.2.4 Cyber security and stability in Europe and internationally

560. France will equip itself with the means to carry out targeted capacity-building actions in the field of cyber security, focusing on priority partners. This support, which is intended to promote the

[87] Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity.

French approach to resilience, may take a structural form (promotion of best practices, capacity-building programmes) or an operational form, including at the military level ("Agile Cyber Partnership" or "Tailored Cyber Partnership"), particularly in Africa.

561. From 2025, France will support the creation of the European cyber reserve and promote the French network of cybersecurity service providers certified by ANSSI.

562. France, together with the United Kingdom, will continue its efforts to implement the code of best practices (Pall Mall process – some twenty signatory states) adopted in April 2025.

3.2.5 Investments in international institutions and partners

563. France must also continue to invest in NATO and European institutions. In general, within the armed forces and the diplomatic service, the career path of senior staff will be redesigned and mobility within NATO and European institutions encouraged, in order to take into account the importance of such multilateral experience in career development.

564. France must continue its commitment to the United Nations (UN), particularly in peacekeeping operations. As with NATO and European institutions, the career path of senior staff will be redesigned and enhanced to encourage experience within UN structures.

565. In Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America, France's security and defence partnerships will be reassessed or strengthened, in accordance with multi-year strategies jointly developed by the Ministries of Europe and Foreign Affairs, the Armed Forces and the Interior. An alternative approach or adaptation of efforts may be proposed, in line with France's national and international interests, both industrial and operational. Where justified, a strategy to strengthen economic partnership will be sought and will accompany these adaptations.

3.3 Support for European capability projects

566. As part of the implementation of the White Paper on European defence, France will also seek to present high added-value projects in the capability areas identified by the conclusions of the extraordinary European Council meeting of 6 March 2025, such as secure space communications, surface-to-air defence and tactical and strategic air transport.

567. The momentum of the European Long-range Strike Approach (ELSA) initiative will be supported, as will accelerated efforts to equip Europe with the critical deep-strike capabilities it needs, with a target date of 2028.

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